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This thesis identifies the contributions of gold from mine to market in financing 
nefarious organizations, sustaining illicit economies, and impacting national economies. 
After identifying common practices at all levels of operations and the market participants 
involved, regional cases from Africa, the Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, and South 
America are discussed, which illuminate the vulnerabilities in this trade. 
Nongovernmental organization, intergovernmental organization, and state responses are 
also discussed in their efforts to counter threat financing, formalize operations, and 
identify problematic sourcing of this highly liquid commodity. Threat financing being 
transnational in nature, the international policy environment in the context of the 
Financial Action Task Force is also analyzed to illuminate network structures and 
identify at-risk states. 
Market operations and the narrative of regional threats were constructed through 
research into United States and intergovernmental organization publications, foreign state 
produced publications and legislation, industry trade-group standards, academic 
literature, and open-source reporting. Published data was also collected from the 
Financial Action Task Force, the World Bank, the United Nations, industry groups, and 
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The financing of operations and the networks in which they exist are key 
components to the business model of transnational criminal (TCO) and violent extremist 
organizations (VEO). Complicating the financial operations of these networks, a complex 
policy environment exists that regulates money service businesses, allows government 
visibility on the transfer of value in the formal sector, and aims to promote the lawful 
integrity of the global financial system. As a result of the increased risk for potential 
discovery of operations by law enforcement and the intelligence community, transactions 
have been driven toward informal value transfer systems (IVTS), fiat currency 
alternatives, and a vast laundering network to disguise the source and destination of 
funds. 
The worldwide scale of money laundering activities is extraordinarily vast. The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009, p. 7) conducted an analysis of 
previously reported data and estimated that the value of laundered funds from TCOs and 
drug trafficking organizations alone “would have been equivalent to around U.S. $650 
billion per year in the first decade of the new millennium, equivalent to 1.5% of global 
gross domestic product (GDP).” To put this in perspective, utilizing reported 2014 GDP 
figures from the World Bank, without even normalizing for inflation, this U.S. $650 
billion represents a position between the GDP of Sweden and Saudi Arabia and would be 
the 20th largest economy (World Bank, 2015a). It is worth noting that the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) does not attempt an independent estimate because of the 
difficulty in tracking these illegal funds (“F.A.Q.,” n.d., How much money is laundered 
per year section, para. 4). 
This illicit economy has the power to destabilize governments and economies 
through the symbiosis of corruption, kleptocracy, illicit trade, and TCOs in areas with a 
weakened rule of law. The National Security Strategy acknowledges these destabilizing 
effects, threat financing’s inherently transnational nature, and the need for counter threat 
finance (CTF) efforts both domestically and internationally (White House, 2015, pp. 15, 
21). 
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CTF has grown alongside the Global War on Terrorism and is viewed as a key 
component in the fight against TCOs and VEOs. DOD Directive 5205.14 (2012, pp. 11–
12) states that 
DOD activities and capabilities [are to] deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat 
finance systems and networks that negatively affect U.S. interests in 
compliance with all existing authorities and procedures… DOD CTF 
counters financing used to engage in terrorist activities and illicit networks 
that traffic narcotics, WMD, Improvised Explosive Devices, other 
weapons, persons, precursor chemicals, and related activities that support 
an adversary’s ability to negatively affect U.S. interests.  
Understanding the financial systems, methods of IVTS, networks that these 
organizations utilize, and the documented nexus between TCOs and VEOs is an essential 
precursor to defeating these organizations. 
Increased globalization has allowed threats to permeate across borders and 
transnational problems have become the norm. Similarly, in threat finance, these 
transnational networks are raising and transferring value in a sometimes borderless world. 
Leveraging the qualities of this environment, threat finance methodologies often take on 
obscure forms and the money trail is convoluted by the intersection of traditional IVTS, 
trade based money laundering (TBML) schemes, bulk cash and commodity smuggling, 
and revolutionary cryptocurrencies. 
A. BACKGROUND 
This thesis examines gold and the illicit exploitation of its operations from mine 
to market. Its importance to CTF resides in the nature of gold’s value density, anonymity, 
and its problematic propensity to exploitation. Like other threat finance methodologies, 
its abuse from mine to market does not exist in a vacuum but its illicit economy extends 
to hawalas, TBML, direct financing of armed groups and human rights abuses, and 
creates ripple effects that are transnational in scale. 
The value density of gold refers to its compact size as a monetary vehicle. 
Demand for gold is worldwide, and it is bought by individuals, industry, and government 
as a store of value. To either satisfy the demand of nefarious actors or integrate illicitly 
sourced gold into the legitimate operational supply, its value density allows it to be 
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inconspicuously smuggled in comparison to bulk cash, and its demand-driven liquidity 
allows it to be easily sold. 
The anonymity of gold also makes it an attractive value storage and transfer 
mechanism. Supreme difficulty arises in ascertaining the exact source of raw gold and 
gold doré, truthful receipts of sourcing and sale can be easily manipulated to obscure 
transfers, and its elemental properties allow it to be easily recast and recycled to obscure 
a sometimes suspect vehicle of threat finance. 
Gold’s potential for exploitation has horrific results on entire regions. Often 
mined in developing nations that sometimes lack the very basic functions of governance, 
armed groups can tax subsistence miners or even wrest control of mining operations as a 
source of fundraising. The absence of armed groups does not even grant immunity from 
exploitation; miners can work in grossly unsafe conditions, debt servitude can be the 
standard, sex workers can be trafficked to meet the demand in ad hoc mining 
encampments, devastating environmental impacts from toxic chemicals are likely, and 
developing governments are deprived of greatly needed tax revenue that could be used 
for investment in society and infrastructure. 
The transnational legitimate operational chain needs proper regulation and 
oversight to avoid the pervasive effects of abuse. On a national scale, policy needs to 
address the precursor environments and methodologies of exploitation. On an 
international scale, the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB), which provide 
their recommendations on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT), need to address these same fundamental vulnerabilities to protect 
the integrity of financial systems and standardize countermeasures.  
B. SCOPE 
This thesis discusses gold’s operational chain from miner to market and the 
vulnerabilities at the intersection of illicit activities and the legitimate. While there are 
definite intersections between the financial misuse of gold and other threat finance 
methodologies, this thesis only gives casual mention to these other aspects and only 
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delves further into their symbiosis when necessary to illustrate the full impacts relevant to 
the CTF analyst. 
Illicit operations are not merely limited to VEOs, TCOs, and other armed groups 
for the purposes of this thesis. The greater economic impacts of illicit gold economies 
require an examination of illegal mining activity and black markets that are not 
necessarily directly tied to violent organizations or criminal enterprises. As an example, 
high demand and tariffs in Region A could lead to purchasing gold smuggled from 
Region B, which in turn could be gold that was sourced from Region C at a mine 
operated by informal subsistence miners. The illicit economy in Region C could then lead 
to human trafficking from Region D. In other words, declaring that the buyer in Region A 
is outside of the scope as they are not part of a nefarious organization would then 
overlook the contribution of demand in Region A to the ongoing issue of human 
trafficking in Region D. 
This thesis also focuses on proactive operational and policy choices for 
countering the illicit operational chain. The FATF and FSRBs are intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) comprised of member states or jurisdictions creating formal 
networks to address and make recommendations on AML/CFT best practices. While 
these networks play an important role, the actual benefits reside within the ties produced 
between actors within these networks. Scalable ties between members based on network 
co-membership can be used to better understand the placement and effectiveness of 
actors within the FATF/FSRB aggregate network through social network analysis (SNA). 
Many IGOs and entities like the United Nations (U.N.), the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are excluded from this analysis because of 
AML/CFT being an ancillary function and their almost universal membership that does 
not always accurately reflect the nuances of regional, religious, ethnically, historically, or 
culturally shared experiences that can add resiliency and strength to ties. The Egmont 
Group is also excluded because of its similarly large membership and because it is based 
off of financial intelligence unit (FIU) cooperation that is generally more operationally 
focused towards reaction instead of proactive policy. A more explicit discussion of the 
network boundaries is detailed in Chapter V.  
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C. CTF LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large collection of literature exists on the CTF subject published by 
governments, IGOs, academics, authors outside of academia, and open source reports. As 
interest in the operational utility of CTF and the awareness of its necessity in providing 
stability has grown, knowledge acquired in this field is continuously disseminated. The 
literature is in large part divided into the categories of individual mechanisms by which 
money is laundered and methodologies for value transfer between individuals or groups, 
best practices for identifying and restricting the ability for these transfers, and 
government and state responses in the CTF realm. This literature review serves as an 
introduction to material published in the general field of CTF on commodity based 
money laundering, TBML, and state responses.  
1. U.S. Government CTF Publications 
The 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004 by the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, serves as an excellent primer to the raw need for 
threat finance intelligence and CTF. This bipartisan report provides a narrative for the 
events preceding 9/11, the terrorist attacks themselves, and responses to the attacks prior 
to offering recommendations for future reorganization to combat the terrorist threat. 
While this report does not focus on the pantheon of terrorist financing, it does offer 
insight into the funding mechanisms of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (AQ). The most relevant 
portions come from the diversity of funding sources, transfer mechanisms, and potential 
governmental complicity. AQ used zakat—a pillar of Islam with the requirement for 
charitable giving- to draw a large quantity of funds for the organization, a network of 
hawalas to transfer money, and safe havens in Sudan and Afghanistan to operate. 
Additionally, the report touches on the allegations of AQ dealing in blood diamonds as a 
store of value but states that there is no “persuasive evidence” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, 
pp. 169–171). 
The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence under the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury leads the U.S. delegation to the FATF (“Financial Action Task Force,” n.d.). 
While the U.S. is the most central state actor in the FATF, the Department of the 
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Treasury also issues reports on findings and best practices in regard to AML/CFT. The 
Treasury’s latest National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment from June 12, 2015 gives 
an overview of the myriad threats posed by terrorist financing and general exploitation of 
the U.S. financial sector (Department of the Treasury, 2015). In this report, mostly 
traditional sources of illicit financing are highlighted in addition to interagency and 
international CTF efforts, but a brief description of successful prosecution against a gold-
backed virtual currency exchange, Liberty Reserve, is given (Department of the Treasury, 
2015, p. 58). This virtual currency case shows the intersection between fiat, commodity, 
and virtual currencies and the international nature of illicit financing. 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Department of 
Homeland Security has periodically been publishing “The Cornerstone Report” since 
2003. Sharing its title with the ICE financial investigation program of the same name, 
Cornerstone provides case overviews and highlights vulnerabilities to the U.S. financial 
sector. Volume I, Number 3 from July, 2004 addresses “Operation Meltdown,” in which 
a black market peso exchange scheme was importing gold bullion to the United States, 
purchasing the bullion with drug profits, melting it down at U.S. jewelers into innocuous 
items like nuts and bolts, and exporting the gold to Columbia for resale at its gold value 
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2004). Not only does this further explain the 
crossover of TBML, international threat finance, and commodity exploitation, but it also 
illustrates the importance of U.S. government literature to the interagency as it provides 
readily available source material to educate the CTF community and provide red flag 
indicators. 
2. IGO and Non-governmental Organizations 
The FATF publishes typology reports, shared case information, best practices 
papers, and trend reports in addition to their recommendations (Financial Action Task 
Force [FATF], 2012). The Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 details 
the exploitation of the gold and diamond commodities sectors to enable the laundering of 
illicit funds. It gives anonymized examples of international laundering schemes regarding 
these commodities, areas prone to exploitation, and rationales for nefarious actors to be 
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inclined to engage in the gold and diamond markets (FATF, 2003). FATF reporting is 
essential because of its international forum and ability to disseminate pertinent 
information for the protection of financial sectors and national economies. 
The World Gold Council (WGC) is a market development agency comprised of 
18 mining companies operating on all continents except for Antarctica (“Our Members,” 
n.d.). One of their products is the Conflict-Free Gold Standard, which addresses 
responsible mining that does not support unlawful armed conflict, protects human rights, 
encourages economic development, and promotes transparency in dealings with host 
governments to lessen the effects of corruption (World Gold Council [WGC], 2012). This 
independent standard of implementation serves to illustrate industry efforts to maintain 
compliance with international efforts and acknowledge the effects of mining on 
corruption, kleptocracy, conflict support, and human rights. 
3. Academic 
Terrorism Financing and State Responses offers a collection of terrorism 
financing resource literature defining the trade space in which nefarious organizations 
choose to make financing decisions and the CTF environment that combats this threat. 
While focusing mainly on religiously motivated terrorist groups but still taking into 
account the lessons learned from criminal enterprises, the authors offer insight on a range 
of issues from terrorism financing intelligence, CTF tradecraft, and emergent threats to 
efficacy of response in a variety of regions and the legislative policy environment used to 
restrain the threat (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007). Anne Clunan discusses international CTF 
efforts including those of the FATF, the origins of the 40 recommendations in U.S. and 
British anti-money laundering standards (Clunan, 2007, p. 265), the policy environment 
that has grown from it, and ultimately that true acceptance of CTF legislative standards 
comes reactively after a terrorist attack (Clunan, 2007, p. 263). 
Martin Meredith’s tome, The Fate of Africa, offers a historical political narrative 
to the African continent since the era of decolonization in the 1960s. While never 
suggested to be a monograph on threat finance, the effects of exploitation and chronic 
corruption are made explicitly clear. The role of conflict resources and corruption are 
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examined through the 1970s kleptocratic regime of the Central African Republic leader 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa, detailed by a $22 million coronation; Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
conflict diamonds and corrupt leadership fueling persistent instability; Zimbabwe’s 
Robert Mugabe, allegedly sanctioning forced labor in 2008 for diamond extraction; 
Rwandan activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, operation of massive 
resource exploitation in gold, diamonds, and coltan; and other corrupt and kleptocratic 
leaders and states (Meredith, 2011, pp. 228, 561–562, 652, 540). Meredith’s contribution 
to CTF lies in the detailed discussion of state level corruption and the compounding 
effects wrought on regional stability. 
Louise Shelley focuses on the interrelations between crime, corruption, and 
terrorism in her book Dirty Entanglements. She uses multiple case studies of terrorist 
attacks to describe the environments in which terrorism and transnational crime can 
flourish and the benefits of terrorist diversification into the criminal sector. Discussing 
the myriad ways of obtaining financing, Shelley describes the adoption of legitimate 
business techniques by terrorist organizations and their use of geographic competitive 
advantage in determining financing methodologies and supply routes (Shelley, 2014, p. 
201). She points towards South America and Africa as being regions of resource 
exploitation concern because of these natural advantages and the follow-on role, learned 
from organized crime, that corruption plays in further movements of these commodities 
(Shelley, 2014, p. 201). 
Cassara and Jorisch discuss the role of gold and diamonds in CTF and financial 
sector security in their book On the Trail of Terror Finance. As a CTF primer for law 
enforcement and the intelligence community, they propose a series of questions for 
investigators to use to assess the laundering risk of gold dealers, the role of gold in 
hawalas, and the myriad of threats that this commodity poses in illicit financing (Cassara 
& Jorisch, 2010, pp. 91–102). One of the larger contributions made by Cassara is the 
Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) concept that is now used in the United States by 
organizations such as ICE. The purpose of TTUs reside in their functions as a 
countermeasure to illicit trade and financing by analyzing trade data looking for 
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irregularities in import/export levels that could be indicative of TBML (Cassara & 
Jorisch, 2010, p. 68). 
4. Independent Reporting and Open Source 
Formerly the Washington Post’s West Africa bureau chief in the Ivory Coast from 
2000–2001, Douglas Farah broke a 2001 story of AQ dealing in blood diamonds within 
the network of Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Farah, 2001). 
The claims of AQ’s linkages to the blood diamond trade is disputed in the 9/11 
Commission Report (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 171), but despite the veracity of the 
explicit claims of sources involved, the overarching narrative of the network mechanisms 
of resource exploitation and masking funds in Sierra Leone and Liberia is unmatched in 
its level of detail. Farah’s experiences in West Africa are further detailed in his 2004 
book, Blood From Stones, which discusses the route of uncut conflict stones from the 
RUF controlled diamond fields of Sierra Leone to European markets and the required 
complicity of government officials (Farah, 2004). Farah also describes in this book the 
capital flight in gold ingots from Afghanistan to Dubai in 2001, the preference of 
hawaladars to utilize gold as a cash settlement method, and the entanglement of the 
Emirati gold markets (souks) and criminal elements across the Indian subcontinent 
(Farah, 2004, pp. 108–124). 
Dubai has also been noted for its centrality in the 9/11 attacks (Kean & Hamilton, 
2004), large quantity of hawaladars based out of its gold souks (O’Brien, 2003), generally 
unregulated informal banking sector (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015d), 
importing and refining smuggled Congolese conflict gold (Bariyo, Freeman, & Pleven, 
2013), misrepresented gold imports (Fitch, 2014), and potential links to organized crime 
on the Indian subcontinent (Farah, 2006). Despite significant legislative efforts by the 
Central Bank of the U.A.E. and the establishment of the DMCC to provide regulation and 
infrastructure for the Dubai commodities market, Dubai maintains a significant role in 
terror financing and the processing and transshipment of conflict gold. 
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D. SNA LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section discusses SNA and its application to analyzing the networks created 
by actor membership in FATF/FSRB organizations. Previous work in the field serves to 
provide theory, context, and a foundation for future literature in its multiple applications. 
Observer status in membership networks creates weak ties between actors that 
lend to connections between various portions of the aggregate network, and Granovetter 
(1973) argues that weak ties serve as bridges that enable the diffusion process. Weak ties 
assist in the speed of information dissemination and can reduce the path distance between 
actors compared to a network that only has strong ties. This is postulated on the 
assumption that actors with a weak tie tend to have different actors in their ego networks 
and thereby the weak ties create bridges in the network. 
Burt’s (1992) theorem on structural holes builds on the work of Granovetter. He 
argues that Granovetter’s weak ties serve to bridge structural holes in the network and put 
actors who control the gap spanning ties in a brokerage role (Everton, 2012, p. 254). Burt 
describes these structural holes as acting like an insulator with non-redundant contacts 
providing connection in this network (Burt, 1992, p. 65). In building aggregate network 
resilience, the theory regarding structural holes is important as redundancy of ties is 
beneficial as no one actor should be in a position of structural brokerage as they can 
influence network actions.  
In the macro policy network environment, strong ties (full membership) reflect 
national self-determination to associate with others in that network. In his case study of a 
west coast firm, Krackhardt argues, “Strong ties constitute a base of trust that can reduce 
resistance and provide comfort in the face of uncertainty (Krackhardt, 1992, p. 218).” 
While not discounting the role that Granovetter’s weak ties play, Krackhardt shows on a 
micro level the structural strength and tendencies afforded by the strong ties in times of 
crisis. Krackhardt concludes by saying that “philos” (friend) relations are foundational 
during times of major change because “change is the product of strong, affective, and 
time-honored relationships (Krackhardt, 1992, p. 238).” 
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Underlying network structures in the aggregate exist beyond simple FATF/FSRB 
membership. Klerks, an academic with the Dutch National Police Academy, wrote about 
the value of network analysis in understanding criminal organizations (Klerks, 2001). His 
work centers on the understanding of criminal organizations as organic networks rather 
than strict hierarchical structures that are often popular in law enforcement. An enduring 
element to his argument for network analysis in understanding criminal organizations can 
likewise be applied to the analysis of bright networks; “Social network analysis not only 
draws attention to established contacts, but also to relationships to appear not to exist and 
are oddly missing (Klerks, 2001, p. 62).”  
Network diameter and closeness between actors is also important for the effects 
related to the spread of influence and the effects of the network on the actor. Christakis’s 
and Fowler’s (2009) discussion on network rules include concepts of how actors seek out 
others that are alike, how position in the network shapes the actor, the role of adjacent 
actors in shaping the subject actor, how actors are influenced by those separated as far 
away as three degrees (“friends’ friends’ friends”), and how network properties affect the 
individual (Christakis & Fowler, 2009, pp. 17–26). Their addendum to Stanley Milgram’s 
(1967) six degrees of separation, that every actor is linked to another actor through six 
degrees, says that all actors are influenced by those up to three degrees away after which 
influence dies out similar to the energy dissipation of a spreading wave (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2009, p. 28). 
E. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
The methodology of this thesis is broken into four main parts: gold’s operational 
chain from miner to market, AML/CFT policy, SNA of the FATF/FSRB aggregate 
network, and proactive operational strategies and policies that can be applied. Out of 
these four segments, SNA is unique in its intensive application of the social sciences, the 
description of the operational chain and policy are both qualitative and quantitative in 
their research intensive approaches, and the strategy and policy recommendations serve 
as the findings based off of the previous work conducted. 
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1. Operational Chain and AML/CFT Policy Methodology and Data 
Sources 
The first requirement to describe the applications of gold to threat financing is to 
describe the parallel illicit and legitimate operational chains. This gives insight into the 
fundamental operations and allows for a discussion of the generic vulnerabilities 
encountered at all levels. This section draws heavily on publications from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), major markets like 
the Dubai Multi Commodities Center (DMCC) and the London Bullion Market 
Association (LBMA), and industry groups like the World Gold Council (WGC). 
After a general presentation of the operational chain, a narrative of specific 
regional examples is given to illustrate the impacts of illicit economies and the 
transnational threats they create. This second part focuses on the environments whether 
political, social, or economic, the threat financing methods used, the actors who employ 
these methods, and the markets that can be infiltrated by illicit commodities. This section 
is diverse in its information sources and draws on publications from three of the “Big 
Four” auditing firms, U.N. expert panels, IGOs, non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
and independent reporting. Immense value is contributed from independent reporting as it 
often gives a hyper-focused view of individual issues and an on-the-ground perspective 
that is sometimes not available to larger and more formal organizations. Sometimes 
inaccuracy is a risk in independent reporting and therefore multiple sources are often 
cross-referenced to ascertain competing claims to the greatest extent possible. 
Policy is the third section with a heavy research methodology. This section offers 
a sample of national level policies aimed at maintaining the integrity of the financial 
sector as it pertains to gold and of IGO recommendations. This section is research 
focused and includes legislation and central bank regulations. This bridges the divide 
between specific operations and state responses to a transnational issue. 
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2. SNA Methodology and Data Sources 
The purpose of Chapter V is to use SNA to better inform strategies of enhancing 
network resilience and policy targeting within the aggregate FATF/FSRB network. Sean 
Everton (2012, p. 5) describes SNA as, “a collection of theories and methods that 
assumes that the behavior of actors (whether individuals, groups, or organizations) is 
profoundly affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.” 
An examination of the macro (state/jurisdiction) level network created by the 
FATF/FSRBs leads to an illumination of the underlying structures and identifies 
interactions that can be leveraged to direct the introduction and efficient targeting of 
policy. Identification of the underlying structures can also be utilized to identify 
problematic actors in the network and issues that affect network resilience. A more in-
depth discussion of SNA methodology is included in Chapter V to give more granularity 
and collocate the analysis’s processes with the results. 
The dataset compiled for this chapter is a membership network of 212 states and 
jurisdictions and is presented with sources and an in-depth explanation in the Appendix. 
The term “membership network” means that the compiled network reflects 212 states’ or 
jurisdictions’ individual participation in one of the nine FATF/FSRB networks. When 
this dataset is “folded,” thereby turning actor-by-organization networks into an 
aggregated actor-by-actor network, ties are now established between states or 
jurisdictions. This reflects the understanding that membership in a single network creates 
ties between all actors within the network because voluntary membership is a conscious 
decision reflecting an underlying reason to be a network member (Everton, 2012, p. 86). 
The primary source of data is the FATF website’s list of country membership in 
the FATF or FSRBs (“Countries,” n.d., data included in table). This provides three 
statuses of affiliation: “member,” “observer,” or “other.” Occasionally, this list is not 
current so individual FSRB websites are consulted for an accurate list of membership. 
However extensive this list seems, it is not all inclusive of the international community. 
As an example, the Islamic Republic of Iran is included in the FATF’s regional body 
matrix despite no status in any organization; but other nations such as Chad, Cameroon, 
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the Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo are excluded. These nations are at high risk for the movement of illicit funds due 
to poor governance and are equally important to include in the aggregate network. 
The World Bank is another intergovernmental organization with responsibilities 
to the security of the international financial sector and its resilience. The World Bank 
periodically publishes a ranking of nation-states’ and certain sub-state entities’ gross 
domestic products (GDP). Data from the document on April 14, 2015 was also included 
to expand the network of actors (World Bank, 2015b). This dataset also contributes 
valuable attribute data to enable the visualization of network membership combined with 
economic data. 
Despite the volume of data included in the World Bank’s report, GDP data was 
not covered for all FATF/FSRB jurisdictions and some nations did not report data. For 
the 19 nations/jurisdictions that did not have data reported to the World Bank, the most 
recent information was instead pulled from the CIA’s The World Factbook. It should be 
noted that the Holy See (Vatican City) does not have a GDP listed in the data set 
ultimately compiled because of exclusion from both World Bank and CIA resources and 
taking data from a third source for a single actor would also be unnecessary because of 
the small economic size.  
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II. THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN 
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report on threat 
financing and the use of alternative remittance systems in which they identified gold as 
being a method for moving and storing value, but not earning value (GAO, 2003, p. 10). 
While gold may often be used to settle account balances among hawaladars, transfer 
value outside government oversight of the formal financial sector, and obscure the money 
trail (Cassara & Jorisch, 2010, pp. 98–101), it must not be overlooked that the sourcing of 
gold can represent a means to earn value for nefarious groups or individuals. 
This chapter explores the supply chain of gold from mining operations through 
placement on the large international markets or sale to the purchaser. Throughout the 
supply chain, opportunities exist for illicitly sourced gold to be integrated into the 
legitimate supply, directly earn value for groups utilizing substandard or forced labor 
practices, or indirectly fund groups through illicit taxation and corruption. 
A. UPSTREAM OPERATIONS 
The origin of commodities in threat financing is the initial point at which value 
can be gained. The OECD cites three sources for gold: mining, recycling, and 
grandfathered stocks (OECD, 2013, pp. 67–68). All three sources hold a degree of 
significance to the CTF analyst but mining and recycling are the two primary methods of 
generating value. Grandfathered stocks primarily are a concern to larger bullion markets 
and their efforts to ensure a conflict-free origin of the marketed commodity. This section 
focuses on the upstream operations –processes from mining to refining- of both 
legitimate and illicit gold production (OECD, 2013, p. 70). 
1. Legitimate Upstream Operations 
There is a vacuity of a universal definition of a legitimate mining operation; for 
the purposes of this thesis it should be assumed that a legitimate operation is one that 
complies with international human rights legislation, maintains oversight on the 
processes throughout its supply chain, is not assisting in the prolonging of illegal armed 
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conflict, and is not intentionally evading state regulations (OECD, 2013, pp. 20–24; 
WGC, 2012, p. 10). This subsection focuses on legitimate mining and refining operations 
while identifying select points where corruption and illegal practices affect its integrity. 
a. Legitimate Mining 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013a, p. 1) estimated that in 2012 around 66% of the 
4,477 metric tons of gold produced came from mined sources while the other 
approximately 33% came from recycled gold. From this, the total gross value added from 
production by the top 15 gold producing countries alone was estimated around U.S. $78.4 
billion (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2013a, p. 1). This total represents the production 
of mainly medium and large scale mines (LSM) and, to a far lesser extent, some artisanal 
and small-scale mines (ASM). 
The OECD defines ASM by their small scale and often labor intensive extraction 
processes. Alluvial deposits (surface deposits embedded in sand or gravel) are often 
exploited in streams, rivers, and areas abandoned by LSM where remnants of former 
deposits are now more accessible (OECD, 2013, p. 67). LSM by the OECD definition 
refers to any mining operation that is not considered to be ASM and uses far more 
sophisticated extraction processes enabling a larger output (OECD, 2013, pp. 65, 67). 
Focusing on the contributions of LSM to the total output of legitimate and 
regulated mining operations, open-pit and underground mines are the two primary 
mechanisms used. Open-pit mining utilizes a series of steps blasted into rock from which 
gold-bearing ore and waste are segregated and then hauled away for initial processing. 
Underground mining utilizes a series of shafts and tunnels to exploit deposits deeper 
underground before ore and waste can be segregated before processing (“Mining,” n.d., 
Underground mines section). After mining, ore is processed and gold is extracted most 
often through the practices of cyanidation or floatation. The output of these initial 
processes is gold doré (85%-90% purity), which is then sent to a refinery for further 
processing (“Mining,” n.d., Cyanidation section; OECD, 2013, p. 67). 
In the early phases of mining and initial refinement, financing of illicit activity by 
legitimate mining operations generally comes in the form of corruption by government 
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officials or illegal taxation assessed by non-state groups (OECD, 2013, p. 71). Another 
possible weakness in this phase is when initial processing of gold-bearing ore occurs at a 
location outside the mines area of control (WGC, 2012, p. 4). In this case, it is not 
necessarily evident that ore contains gold or other valuable elements and avoidance or 
evasion of tariffs may occur by the company or individual actors seeking to make 
financial gain (WGC, 2012, pp. 28–29). 
b. Legitimate Refining 
Dependent on geography and infrastructure, gold doré may be produced either by 
the mine on-site or at separate refineries (WGC, 2012, p. 28). Following arrival at the 
refinery, gold doré is then refined from its initial 85%-90% purity to a purity of 99.5% or 
higher depending on its planned end state purposes (“Refining,” n.d.). After this point, 
the refined gold then enters the downstream chain as it moves to the market. 
The highly alterable nature of elemental gold causes refining to be one of the 
intersections where illicitly-sourced gold can be integrated into the legitimately-sourced 
pipeline. Initiatives such as the Conflict-Free Gold Standard intend to codify due 
diligence procedures among mining operations to ensure the integrity of the upstream 
supply chain, but refiners should also ensure that sourced gold doré comes from 
legitimate mining operations (WGC, 2012, p. 30). Refiners are also susceptible to bribery 
in order to conceal the origin of gold being refined, invoice manipulation, and general 
product misrepresentation (Cassara & Jorisch, 2010, pp. 98–99; OECD, 2013, p. 71). 
2. Illicit Upstream Operations 
Illicit upstream operations may be more easily defined as they contain the inverse 
characteristics of legitimate operations and generally disregards sanctions, rule of law, 
human rights, and may serve to fund and enable the continuation of illegal conflict 
(OECD, 2013, pp. 20–24; WGC, 2012, p. 10). This subsection focuses on illicit ASM, its 
characteristics, and its impact on the integrity of the supply chain. 
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a. Illicit Mining 
All ASM operations are not illicit but ASM is more likely to be an indicator of 
illegal activity. PwC summarizes the potential benefits and economic impact of ASM 
operations “particularly in low income and Highly Indebted Poor Countries” but also 
acknowledges that “the sector faces some key challenges, including weak controls and 
regulations, poor social and environmental practices, the use of child labour and 
smuggling of gold involving criminal networks” (PwC, 2013a, p. 17). Even though ASM 
operations may be a readily available source of employment in impoverished areas and 
have a positive economic impact, monitoring for substandard conditions must be 
maintained and ASM must serve as a risk factor for illicit financing. 
As previously discussed, a characteristic of ASM is its low technological methods 
and small scale (OECD, 2013). The low level of investment required to start an operation 
leads to choosing areas that are economically viable without the use of heavy machinery 
and on-site infrastructure like processing facilities for the production of gold doré. 
Alluvial gold mining, being a cheap and readily accessible source that can be conducted 
without infrastructure, serves as a high risk indicator for potentially illegally sourced gold 
(FATF, 2008, p. 24). 
A common method of initial extraction of gold from the silt of alluvial mining or 
milled ore is mercury amalgamation. In this process mercury is mixed with a gold-
containing silt or slurry, the amalgam is then strained through a cloth to further remove 
impurities, and the resultant ball of mercury gold amalgam is approximately 80% 
mercury by weight and 20% precious metal (Blacksmith Institute, 2010). After the 
amalgam is obtained it is heated with a blowtorch or in an open flame oven to vaporize 
the mercury and leave the gold particles behind (“Artisanal Gold Mining,” n.d., 
Description section, para. 2). Gold cyanidation may be used instead of mercury 
amalgamation or as an additional method to further extract particles from the waste 
product. In this process, the silt or slurry is mixed with cyanide forming a water soluble 
compound and then zinc is added to extract the gold (Blacksmith Institute, 2010; 
“Mining,” n.d., Cyanidation section). 
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The adverse effects upon the health of mine workers and the environment are 
readily apparent. Workers often have no respiratory or skin protection suitable to guard 
against the effects of mercury vapors and waste products of both processes are commonly 
released directly into the environment. 
ASM is not a substitute term for illicit mining practices but the low investment, 
readily available sources, and ease of starting an operation without drawing attention to 
lack of regulations in force loans itself to being easily exploited by nefarious groups. The 
small quantities processed on site can also easily be integrated into other stocks of 
legitimately mined gold or smuggled across borders to obscure its origin (OECD, 2013, 
p. 71). 
b. Illicit Refining 
Refining of the processed gold from illicitly mined sources does not differ from 
the processes of legitimate operations. The products of mercury amalgamation or gold 
cyanidation may have a similar purity to gold doré but the ease of transport of an ASM’s 
product versus the large quantities produced by LSM are the differentiating factor in how 
easily the product can be integrated into legitimate supply chains. 
An ASM with extremely lax regulation sits in the Peruvian Andes in the village of 
La Rinconada at approximately 16,700 feet above sea level (“La Rinconada, Peru,” n.d., 
Elevation in right margin). In these mines, payment comes in the form of cachorreo in 
which no official wage is paid by the company but instead workers can pocket all the 
gold-bearing ore they can carry on one day per month (Finnegan, 2015; Verité, 2012). 
These miners in turn take the gold flake they have to a middleman who pays a rate off of 
the daily spot price, melts the week’s take into doré, and then smuggles the product on 
foot across the border into La Paz, Bolivia for Bolivian and Brazilian buyers (Finnegan, 
2015). 
While the ASM operations in La Rinconada may have disputable levels of 
legitimacy, lax regulation and substandard wage practices contribute to avenues where a 
legitimate product may be diverted to unknown buyers. These buyers knowingly engage 
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in illegal smuggling practices and then integrate the product into the greater gold supply, 
possibly using the proceeds off of a bargain purchase for further criminal activities. 
B. DOWNSTREAM OPERATIONS 
Downstream operations refer to the second portion of the operational chain, from 
refiner to end user (OECD, 2013, p. 70). At this point in the operational chain, onus is 
often placed on the retailer or bullion market to ensure legitimacy of the gold source 
whether it is from a bullion refiner or an individual seller of bullion or other gold vehicle. 
1. Legitimate Downstream Operations 
The legitimate world demand for gold in 2012 stood at 3,611 tons with jewelry, 
investment, and official sector purchases accounting for approximately 90% of the 
demand (PwC, 2013a, pp.27, 29). This subsection focuses primarily on describing the 
market in two locations through the LBMA and the DMCC. 
a. LBMA 
London is the largest market for gold bullion and the LBMA regulates the Good 
Delivery List, wholly owns Precious Metals Prices Ltd which sets the twice daily London 
spot price, and published the Responsible Gold Guidance (RGG) which accredits refiners 
as having sufficient quality in their product and ensures that they have met responsible 
source criteria (LBMA, 2015, pp. 2–4). The services offered and functions conducted by 
the LBMA and its participating members include over the counter (OTC) trades between 
individual investors or central banks, vaulting services for traded gold, clearing and 
settling of accounts through paper transfers in order to not have to transfer physical 
metal, and the setting of spot prices in U.S. dollars (“The London Bullion Market,” n.d.). 
The Good Delivery bar is the highest standard for bullion and is the common unit 
of trade on the LBMA. Allowed to specified tolerances, the Good Delivery bar is 
generally 400 troy ounces in weight with a minimum 995.0 parts per thousand fine gold 
(“Good Delivery Rules,” n.d., Specifications for a good delivery gold bar section). 
Refiners are certified for production and allowed to supply the LBMA after meeting 
certain criteria including five years in operation, a minimum 10 tons annual production, 
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£15 million net worth, and adherence to the RGG (LBMA, n.d.). These controls require 
third party audits of both refining processes and adherence to due diligence sourcing 
requirements and know your customer (KYC) regulatory compliance (LBMA, 2015, p. 
4). 
In the London OTC market, the Market Makers conduct the transactions on behalf 
of their clients with the five full members (ability to sell spots, forwards, and options) 
being Barclays Bank Plc, Goldman Sachs International, HSBC Bank USA NA, JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, and UBS AG while an additional nine Market Makers without the 
ability to sell all three products include members such as Citibank NA, Credit Suisse, and 
Deutsche Bank AG (“Membership,” n.d., Market-making members section). The 
minimum transaction size is 1,000 troy ounces of gold creating frequent sizable 
transactions (LBMA, 2008, p. 5). 
Opportunities for illicit financing on this major market come in two forms: 
refiners’ sourcing and customers’ objectives. While responsible sourcing guidance is in 
place through the LBMA RGG in accordance with the OECD due diligence guidance, it 
is still possible for illegally sourced gold to be integrated into the legitimate supply chain 
at some refiners because of the sheer quantity of gold being refined (LBMA, 2015, p. 4). 
The second threat of customers’ objectives is partially mitigated through KYC 
regulations but storing and transferring illicit funds is possible when banks are not able to 
catch evidence of possible red flags. 
b. DMCC 
The DMCC is a Government of Dubai strategic initiative founded in 2002 to 
regulate and encourage growth in the Dubai commodities market through infrastructure 
management (“DMCC—Who We Are,” n.d., Who we are section). In 2011, 754 tons of 
gold was imported into Dubai and the sum value of imports and exports totaled 
approximately U.S. $56 billion, solidifying Dubai as the largest gold market in the 
Middle East (“Dubai Gold Trade Statistics,” n.d.). 
The DMCC has also created the Dubai Good Delivery (DGD) to its own 
specifications of 995 parts per thousand fine gold with a standard weight of 1 kg within 
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specified tolerances (“Accreditation Initiatives,” n.d., About DGD section). The DGD list 
is similar to the one produced by London in that it specifies accredited refiners and 
requires compliance to quality standards and responsible sourcing guidelines. 
The DMCC has majority ownership of the Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange 
(DGCX). The DGCX offers clients the ability to trade in gold futures and across a range 
of other commodities including hydrocarbons, silver, and copper. This commodities 
exchange benefits from Emirati market regulations, the transnational business 
environment of Dubai, and the geographical situation of Dubai between the markets of 
Europe and Asia (“About DGCX,” n.d., Benefits of trading on DGCX section). 
The DMCC has implemented the OECD due diligence guidance and requires 
participating refineries to adhere to these risk based countermeasures (DMCC, 2012, p. 
1). The DMCC’s guidance is comparable to the LBMA RGG as both are based off of the 
OECD’s five-step guidance, require risk identification, risk response, and third-party 
auditing (SGS United Kingdom Ltd, 2014, pp. 7, 16–17). 
Opportunities for illicit financing through the DMCC and the DGCX are very 
similar to the LBMA. Due diligence processes mandated by market regulations are only 
as strong as the due diligence by the upstream operations of the refiners and miners. KYC 
regulations, AML/CFT regulations, and willingness of the government to prosecute 
violators remain the key mechanisms to maintain market legitimacy. 
Third-party audit compliance mandated by the DMCC’s guidance has had its 
successes. In May, 2015, Al Kaloti Jewellers Factory LTD was delisted from the DGD 
list for failures in responsible sourcing compliance (DMCC, 2015; McAuley, 2015). 
While responsible sourcing policies and accreditation mechanisms for large markets 
incentivize transparency, large throughput at both individual companies and the Dubai 
commodities market make enforcement difficult. 
2. Illicit Downstream Operations 
This subsection focuses on illicit operations from the refiner to the end user by 
highlighting small smuggling operations and gold recycling. The OECD guidance refers 
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to recycled gold as taking an unprocessed form –returned gold products to the refiner, 
melted gold—gold products that have been melted into gold stock by the refiner, or 
industrial byproduct—gold that is a secondary output from the mining of another metal 
(OECD, 2013, p. 68). It should be noted that recycled gold products are not illegal and 
represented 36% of sourced gold in 2012 (PwC, 2013a, p. 4), but it is a potential 
weakness in downstream operations that could be used to transfer value and obscure the 
financial trail. 
a. Smuggling 
The weight and mutability of gold makes it an excellent vehicle to discreetly 
transport value. At a July 29, 2015 approximate spot price of U.S. $1,100 per troy ounce, 
a one kg bar of 0.995 fineness gold is worth over U.S. $35,000. This illustrates the ease in 
which couriers can smuggle bullion compared to cash. Further benefitting the smuggler, 
the spot prices are easily accessible, demand is always present, and gold is immune to 
inflationary pressures present in unstable economies when smuggling bulk cash (Cassara 
& Jorisch, 2010, pp. 92–96). 
Farah (2002) documented the allegation that the Taliban used gold to smuggle 
assets out of Afghanistan to Karachi, Pakistan in late 2001 in order to move assets away 
from coalition forces. Estimated at U.S. $10 million in a three week period, this gold was 
then further smuggled or exchanged through hawalas where funds were then obscured in 
the greater Dubai market (Farah, 2002). This quantity is relatively easy to move with 
porous borders and ineffective governance. The relationship between gold and hawala 
should also be noted in downstream operations as gold smuggling can be used to balance 
accounts between hawaladars (Cassara & Jorisch, 2010, pp. 100–101). 
In the Dubai market, an Ernst and Young (EY) whistleblower conducting a third-
party audit of Kaloti found multiple problems in their sourcing. On the DGD list since 
February, 2010 (DMCC, 2015), Kaloti was found to have made U.S. $5.2 billion in 
payments without documentation, imported four tons of gold into the U.A.E. that was 
spray-painted silver to avoid scrutiny, and allegedly was conflict sourced from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Verity, 2014). Eventually delisted from the DGD in 
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2015, this case of smuggled commodities from a listed and previously vetted organization 
shows the extent to which gold can be brazenly smuggled into a large market. 
India, the largest consumer of gold (PwC, 2013a, p. 29), has seen a surge in 
smuggled gold being imported. To avoid customs and import tariffs on the precious 
metal, smugglers have begun recasting the metal into objects like belt buckles and 
flashlight batteries (Ray, 2014). The primary rationale for smuggling gold into India may 
be tax avoidance but the ease and inventiveness of smugglers should peak the awareness 
of CTF analysts. 
b. Recycled Gold 
Gold recycling is another point at which illicit funds may be integrated into the 
legitimate supply. By receiving finished gold products and reprocessing them for future 
sale to industry, investors, or jewelers, the origin is obscured and anonymity of the 
participants is secured. While recycled gold represents an approximate one-third share of 
sourced gold (PwC, 2013a, p. 4), there is a high level of risk in this market. 
The OECD guidance recommends consistency in a risk-based approach for 
recyclers, adherence to KYC regulations, and adoption of an accounting system to match 
inputs to outputs (OECD, 2013, pp. 86–96). The myriad of sources and suppliers of 
legitimate recycled gold can easily allow the integration of smuggled and illicitly sourced 
metal. The product can contain multiple origins that become more difficult to ascertain as 
it flows from recyclers to refiners and back to the market with potentially inadequate due 
diligence processes (OECD, 2013, p. 71). 
C. SUMMARY 
The gold supply chain from source to ultimate consumer contains numerous 
independent entities each with their own inherent vulnerabilities. The operational chain 
provides opportunities to generate, store, and transfer value for nefarious actors and 
contribute to the perpetuation of conflict. Industry groups and regulatory bodies have 
worked towards mitigating these risks through due diligence guidelines and licensing of 
market participants but abuses are still bound to occur in such a large market. 
 25 
Chapter III builds upon the foundations of the operational chain in this chapter. 
By presenting regional threats of illicit financing utilizing gold, gaps in policy and red-
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III. REGIONAL THREATS 
Gold is a crucial part of state level financial policy, a mechanism of investment 
for many banks and individuals, and a show of wealth and status in most parts of the 
world. While policies and regulations are set in place to protect the integrity of these 
markets, integration of illicitly sourced gold into legitimate supplies and the store of 
value in a generally anonymous commodity by nefarious groups prove to be salient 
threats. 
Felbab-Brown (2010, pp. 175–177) discusses three contributing factors to the 
formation and continuing operation of illicit economies: the provision of an ungoverned 
space, governments that are unwilling or unable to stop the illicit activities, and an 
existing demand for the product. This chapter discusses regional threats emanating from 
some of these ungoverned or under-governed spaces. While this chapter is not all 
inclusive in its presentation of where illicit markets operate, it does serve to relate the 
illicit market operations discussed in the previous chapter to specific regional 
occurrences. 
A. AFRICA 
This section discusses the upstream operations in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). Situated in the African Great 
Lakes Region (“About the Great Lakes Region,” n.d.), the DRC has been noted as a 
hotbed of instability with warring factions controlling mines, taxing miners and 
smugglers, and directly conducting a myriad of human rights abuses (CIA, 2015b). In the 
eastern DRC, South Kivu is a major center for this activity and as much as 50% of the 
DRC’s gold production comes from here (The Enough Project [Enough], 2012, p. 4). The 
DRC, along with its neighboring countries including the CAR, were singled out in 
section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010. This legislation requires disclosure of all minerals sourced from this conflict region 
and an independent audit of the purchasing entities due diligence procedures to ensure 
that the purchase of mined products does not fund or aid armed groups. 
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1. Democratic Republic of the Congo 
In the DRC, mining that drives further conflict comes from cassiterite –used in the 
production of tin, coltan –a portmanteaux of colombite and tantalite, wolframite –an ore 
that contains tungsten, and gold (de Koning, 2011, p. 5). These minerals are often 
collectively referred to by the acronym 3TG. In the eastern DRC a perpetual state of 
conflict has seen Congolese military forces, Rwandan Patriotic Army, Rwandan proxy 
forces, Ugandan and Lebanese dealers, and Congolese rebel groups involved in the 
extraction and supply chain of 3TG. Resource concessions were also granted by the 
Kabila regime to Angola and Zimbabwe in exchange for assistance (Meredith, 2011, pp. 
537–544). The dynamics of the conflict have led to persistent instability, lack of rule of 
law, and systemic corruption. 
Estimating the size of the conflict gold trade in the DRC is problematic because of 
the lack of accurate figures, number of groups involved, and ever-changing pipelines for 
smuggling gold out of the region. Utilizing figures from the IMF’s 2010–2011 country 
report and those reported by Yager in the U.S. Geological Survey’s 2007 Minerals 
Yearbook, the IMF shows the scale of the illicit gold trade in the DRC where official 
gold exports totaled 150 kg but its estimated production was approximately 10 metric 
tons (IMF, 2014, p. 5). In his policy paper, de Koning (2011, p. 11–12) arrives at a 
Congolese production figure of 10 metric tons for 2006 by calculating the difference of 
exports and domestic production in the neighboring countries of Burundi and Uganda. De 
Koning also notes a drop off in exports from Uganda and Burundi following 2008 and 
attributes this to being indicative of different smuggling methods being used. 
In the Congolese supply chain, the critical market participants are négociants—
who are the individual traders, and comptoirs—the larger buying houses (de Koning, 
2011, p. 5). These market participants may be aligned with certain groups in the conflict 
or may be taking protection from these groups to further fund the conflict and evade 
sanctions on Congolese exports. The négociants often buy from the ASM operations and 
then bring the raw gold to the cities of Bukavu and Butembo, being taxed by armed 
groups and the Congolese army while enroute, and then sell the gold to the comptoirs 
(Bafilemba and Lezhnev, 2015, p. 7). 
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After being collected in the larger cities, gold is then smuggled to Uganda, 
Burundi, and Tanzania where the origin of gold is obscured through a false declaration of 
sourcing and sold to a smuggler who then takes the gold on to Dubai or even allegedly 
sold to conflict linked companies like Berkenrode (operating out of Belgium) (Enough 
Team, 2012, p. 8). Gold can also be directly smuggled from the DRC to locations like 
Dubai where consumer products are bought and repatriated to the DRC in a TBML style 
of operation (de Koning, p. 2011, p. 13). 
The trade in conflict gold is extremely damaging to the Congolese economy 
where the 2014 GDP was U.S. $55.8 billion and the GDP per capita was estimated at 
around U.S. $700 (CIA, 2015b). The economic contributions by the conflict gold industry 
to the DRC is difficult to quantify as value is not dispersed in an illicit economy in a 
manner similar to what could be seen in a formal mining sector. Child labor, trade control 
by armed factions, cross-incentives by corrupt governments and kleptocratic officials, 
and an inability for governments to enforce rule of law all lead to a continuing crisis in 
the upstream operations. 
2. Central African Republic 
The CAR is another nation in the expanded African Great Lakes region beset with 
a tumultuous political history and mired by extreme violence. Currently operating under a 
presidency emplaced by the National Transitional Council (CNT), elections are expected 
to be held in the final quarter of 2015 (CIA, 2015a). The United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) which has 
approximately 11,000 U.N. uniformed personnel is tasked with protecting the civilian 
population, human rights, and supporting the CNT (“MINUSCA Facts and Figures,” n.d., 
Strength section; Security Council, 2015). The French military also conducts 
deployments to the CAR. 
The major non-state armed groups in the ongoing conflict in the CAR are the ex-
Séléka and the anti-balaka. The ex-Séléka are comprised of mainly Muslim forces of 
multi-origin militias that integrated with the Séléka movement before it dissolved, 
becoming the ex-Séléka. The anti-balaka are Christian civilians formed into ad hoc 
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militias in response to the ex-Séléka (Mellgard, 2015). A third player in the conflict is the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony who also conducts operations in 
Uganda and the DRC (CIA, 2015a). 
Michel Djotodia, the head of the Séléka before he officially disbanded it, seized 
power in 2013. He became the first Muslim President in an 80% Christian nation, and 
subsequently was pressured into resignation in January, 2014 (CAR interim president 
Michel Djotodia resigns, 2014). The ex-Séléka have since moved their headquarters from 
the capital of Bangui in the south to Bambari in the central region of the CAR where 
there is a majority Muslim population. 
One ex-Séléka controlled mining town is Ndassima. Located approximately four 
hours from Bambari, this mine was formerly owned by Canadian exploration company 
Axmin Inc. before being abandoned in 2012 (Gridneff, 2015). Currently, artisanal miners 
use this location and are illegally taxed and are even issued mining licenses by the ex-
Séléka (Flynn, 2014). Under extremely dangerous and completely unregulated 
conditions, the ex-Séléka allegedly net 15 kg of gold on a monthly basis. This is reported 
to be valued at U.S. $350,000 on the local market (Dembassa-Kette, 2014). 
After the ore goes through mercury amalgamation to produce raw gold, it is then 
smuggled out to neighboring countries and sold in exchange for weapons (Gridneff, 
2015). The conflict in the CAR has produced approximately 140,000 refugees of which 
106,000 have fled to Cameroon (Kitidi, 2014). This diaspora has allowed established 
smuggling pipelines to form and aid the illegal export of raw gold. 
The LRA has also diversified into raw gold. Reports involve business deals 
between the LRA and an ex-Séléka officer named Ahmed Sherif (Enough, 2014, p. 2; 
PECAR, 2014, Annex 19). Raw gold has also been allegedly used by the LRA to 
purchase weapons from the Janjaweed in Sudan (Enough, 2014, p. 2). 
The ongoing conflict in the CAR is devastating in the deaths produced, human 
rights abuses by the anti-balaka and the ex-Séléka, and economically. With a 2014 GDP 
of U.S. $1.79 billion and a GDP per capita of $600, resource exploitation to perpetuate 
the conflict dominates the economy (CIA, 2015a). Official exports are extremely low 
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while the estimated production is about 2 metric tons, worth approximately U.S. $60 
million or what would be over 3% of the economy (PECAR, 2014, para. 135). In 2014, 
Badica and the National Union of Mining Cooperatives of Central Africa were the only 
two companies to officially export gold with a sum total official export figure of 1.7 kg 
(PECAR, 2014). The largest gold buyer in the CAR, Badica, only purchased 1 kg which 
it then turned into lightweight necklaces so that it could avoid export tariffs on raw gold 
(PECAR, 2014, paras. 135–136). The opportunity cost of the illicit economy supplanting 
legitimate companies like Axmin Inc. is immeasurable in all factors to include worker 
safety, potential exports lost, mining capacity, and regional investment.  
B. DUBAI 
This section focuses on downstream operations and how illicitly sourced gold is 
integrated into the legitimate market. While downstream operations are by definition the 
segment of the supply chain from refiner to consumer, for this section it is also helpful to 
include the segment of operations from the smuggling/illegal exporter to the refiner. This 
section does not insinuate that Dubai’s market is entirely or even majority illicit, but 
instead uses a case example of how a developing market can be exploited for nefarious 
ends. 
In contrast to the impoverished states of the DRC and CAR, the thriving and 
diversified nature of Dubai’s financial sector is one of the reasons that it is at a 
heightened risk for money laundering and terrorist financing (Department of State [DoS], 
2015, pp. 458–459). The growing Dubai gold market makes up approximately 20–25% of 
world gold trade and is at a heightened risk to money laundering and terrorist financing 
through its scale (Asfour, 2015; Bowers, 2014; Global Witness [GW], 2014, p. 2). 
A peculiar factor affecting the legitimacy of the Dubai market is the souks. The 
gold souks are a marketplace of approximately 250 jewelers, gold dealers, assayers, and 
refiners who have the capacity and means to buy, sell, and recycle raw gold, coinage, 
bullion, and jewelry (Enough Team, 2012, p. 10). This is a significant contributing factor 
to the ease of which money can be laundered and the movement of funds can be obscured 
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through multiple transactions across a combination of highly liquid commodity and fiat 
currencies. 
In the souk, cash-for-gold dealers can be a significant threat for the integration of 
illicit gold. Enough (2012, p. 10) points toward these souk dealers paying approximately 
10% below spot price for undocumented gold. After purchasing the raw gold, they are 
then able to recycle it into ingots or bullion before selling it to jewelers or larger 
companies. The U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC’s investigation into the trail of 
conflict gold through Dubai noted that souk merchants were able to easily purchase gold 
from the DRC in cash and no questions were asked about the origins of the gold (Group 
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo [GEDRC], 2015, paras. 210–215). 
Illicit finance becomes more entangled when gold is bought from unknown 
sources in the souks. Dubai is a global center for hawala (Cassara & Jorisch, 2010, pp. 
125–126; O’Brien, 2003) and the souk has the capital and liquidity to maintain 
operations. With conflict gold being bought at premiums and recycled into anonymously 
sourced bullion, hawala being frequently settled with gold shipments (Cassara & Jorisch, 
2010, pp. 100–101), and TBML often being used to repatriate value to the countries of 
origin, it is truly a transnational problem. 
Larger Dubai gold market participants are not immune to dealing in illegally 
sourced gold either. The GEDRC’s narrative on DRC-sourced conflict gold in Dubai 
said: 
The Dubai Multi Commodities Centre told the Group about its continuous 
efforts to make the gold trade in Dubai more responsible, mainly through 
the Responsible Market Participant initiative. In response to a Group 
request for more information, the United Arab Emirates stated that, as at 
18 November, only one company, Kaloti Jewellery International, was 
involved in the initiative. (GEDRC, 2015, para. 213) 
Kaloti Jewellery International is a part of Kaloti Precious Metals. As previously 
mentioned, Kaloti’s Sharjah refinery has been delisted from the DMCC for due diligence 
failures in their sourcing (DMCC, 2015; McAuley, 2015). During the EY audit of Kaloti, 
it was discovered by the auditors that 2.4 tons of gold were acquired by the company via 
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cash-for-gold transactions in the souk without counterparty names or gold origin being 
recorded (Bowers, 2014). 
Certain allegations have also been brought against the DMCC itself in the Kaloti 
case. These include the DMCC telling EY that the non-compliance results should be kept 
confidential (Bowers, 2014) and giving instructions on the report verbiage such as how 
findings of “‘non-compliant low-risk’ are now to be termed by the auditor as ‘compliant 
with low-risk deviations’ (GW, 2014, p. 8).” 
As Dubai develops a reputation as a global financial and commodities center, 
major issues still stand in the way. The light government management, number of free 
trade zones, and anonymity of business transactions lends itself to be a potential haven 
for money laundering and terrorist financing. Despite the growth of conflict-sourced 
commodity regulation, complacent or complicit actors can derail the positive goals and 
have far reaching consequences affecting legitimacy of international investment in 
bullion, entanglement with dark hawala transactions spanning the Middle East and South 
Asia, and funding armed non-state actors in Africa that prolong conflict and oppress the 
citizenry. 
C. SOUTH ASIA 
This section brings a third region into the equation of illicit gold operations. 
While illicit downstream operations are found throughout most economies, with a higher 
prevalence in the developing world, high demand coupled with imperfect controls can 
fuel illicit economies. The scale of business operations and ties between India and Dubai 
assist in the movement of gold between nations often outside of the formal market sector. 
India is not alone in the South Asian illicit market for gold but it does represent the 
greatest level of demand from a population that only has 53% participation in bank 
accounts of any type (World Bank, 2015c). 
India is the world’s largest consumer of gold with consumption demand in 2012 
at approximately 864 metric tons and fabrication demand at 942 metric tons per year 
(PwC, 2013a, p. 29). For this same year, production of gold decreased by more than 10% 
with estimated reserves of only 67 metric tons (U.S. Geological Survey, 2014, pp. 10.1, 
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10.14). In a nation where gold holds such strong cultural, religious, and general financial 
significance (Farah, 2004, p. 111), this imbalance shows the complete reliance on 
imported gold to satisfy demand. 
A constant theme in Indian gold smuggling is the state’s tariffs on imports. Given 
India’s high demand and the price of gold being set in U.S. dollars, both a strong U.S. 
dollar and raising import tariffs result in gold becoming more expensive for the consumer 
(Shumsky & Mukherji, 2015). As an effect from the rising prices, smuggling then 
becomes more attractive (WGC, 2015, p. 8). 
The annual quantity of gold smuggled into India is generally estimated at just 
below 200 metric tons (Afonso, 2015; Sharma & Das, 2015; WGC, 2015, p. 8). Reports 
of smuggling from Dubai often involve small scale movements via individual couriers on 
flights. This gold is reportedly smuggled to India in the form of finished jewelry, often 
concealed in body cavities, and even Indian workers in the U.A.E. are used as impromptu 
couriers in exchange for airfare (Afonso, 2015; Sloan, 2014). 
A reliance on imports, enormous and steady demand, and imposition of import 
tariffs leads to a growing market for smuggling operations. Threats arise from the scale of 
the smuggling operations, with potential conservative estimates of smuggled gold 
accounting for 25% of the quantity of official imports, a developing government and 
economy is losing out on a substantial stream of revenues and an environment that can 
foster corruption through issue avoidance is being established. The pull from consumers 
on the demand side also may pressure middlemen and refiners in Dubai to pull on the 
suppliers from conflict affected regions, thus taking on additional risk to potentially fund 
armed groups and prolong conflict. 
D. SOUTH AMERICA 
South America is home to a host of developing economies and contains three 
countries that are among the top 15 gold producers: Peru, Brazil, and Argentina (PwC, 
2013a, p. 13). In the context of this discussion, the effects of ASM operations are 
highlighted in a discussion of illegal and informal mining operations in Peru outside the 
confines of conflict sourcing. 
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Peru is a resource rich nation that in 2012 was ranked sixth in gold production and 
second in silver production (KPMG, 2013, p. 2). Peru has a GDP per capita of U.S. 
$11,800, but as of 2012, 25.8% of the population lived beneath the poverty level and 6% 
lived in extreme poverty (CIA, 2015c; PwC, 2013b, p. 7). ASM does provide a living for 
an impoverished segment of the population but it also introduces criminal elements, 
grossly substandard worker conditions and exploitation, human trafficking, takes revenue 
away from the state that could be used for investment purposes, and has profound 
environmental impacts. A 2013 Peruvian government publication and article in El 
Mercurio (as cited in Verité, 2012, p. 18) estimated that ASM directly employs 100,000 
people with another five times the amount indirectly supporting the industry. 
Further quantifying the scale of this illicit economy, EY estimated that illegal 
mining constitutes 20% of Peruvian gold production (EY, 2014, p. 36). In response to this 
growing threat, the government under President Ollanta Humala took a carrot-and-stick 
approach to illegal ASM operations by offering a deadline of April, 2014 for these 
operations to begin the process of becoming legal and in the interstitial time period before 
they are formalized, to continue operations (Dube & Kozak, 2014; EY, 2014, p. 37; 
Jamasmie, 2014). Despite these measures, informal operations continue to occur in the 
Peruvian Andes and the low-lying Amazon basin in the environmentally sensitive and 
protected region of Madre de Dios. 
In 2013, PwC stated, “six mining companies and the small producers of the region 
of Madre de Dios concentrate 62% of [gold] production (PwC, 2013b, p. 16).” While not 
discussing the total implications of this statement, most of the problems lie with the 
“small producers” mentioned. The Peruvian government defines the legality of operations 
by their concession permits, registration, environmental impact surveys, consultation with 
the indigenous to ascertain the social impacts, and labor practices (EY, 2014, pp. 35–37; 
KPMG, 2013, pp. 9–11; PwC, 2013b, pp. 34–37; Verité, 2012, p. 17). In practice, illegal 
mining operations occur throughout Madre de Dios without attempts at formalization. 
In Madre de Dios, forests are clear cut of vegetation and then the ground is 
blasted with water so the resulting silt can then be exploited through filtration and 
mercury amalgamation. This process destroys jungle habitats, puts high levels of 
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sediment into the rivers where all life dies, and pollutes the groundwater and downstream 
areas with mercury (Elbein, 2015; Verité, 2012, pp. 24–25). The worst effects of the 
illegal operations come from the indirect operations needed to support this illicit 
economy. Debt bondage (known locally as habilitación-enganche), human trafficking for 
labor, support, and sexual services, child labor, laundering, smuggling, and payment 
through cachorreo (as discussed in the example of ASM in La Rinconada) all occur 
(Finnegan, 2015; Verité, 2012, pp. 21–27, 63). 
Integration of illicitly mined gold occurs through sales to larger refineries, cash-
for-gold shops, and smuggling to Bolivia for export (Finnegan, 2015; Verité, 2012, pp. 
25–27, 48–50, 54, 63, 74–76). As a result, tax revenue from corporate income tax, 
mineral taxes, value added taxes, royalties, and concession rights are all lost (KPMG, 
2013, p. 11; PwC, 2013b, p. 37). El Mercurio (as cited by Verité, 2012, p. 25) reported 
that Peru has lost tax revenue of U.S. $450 million each year because of illegal 
operations. This loss only quantifies the potential tax revenue; the benefits to formalized 
mining operations could also stop the illicit support economy thereby increasing tax 
revenue from these businesses, increase worker and environmental safety, and lessen the 
market for human trafficking. 
E. SUMMARY 
Illicit economies can develop around all operations leading to human rights 
abuses, financing of conflict, depriving the state of much needed tax revenues, and 
producing a vehicle for money to be laundered, transferred, and obscured. As this illicit 
market is transnational in nature, policy needs to be formulated that addresses external 
vulnerabilities in addition to the internal. This next chapter presents the policy 
environment of select states, IGOs, and industry groups aimed at stopping this illicit 
economy from a macro perspective. 
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IV. POLICY AND REGULATION 
This chapter details select policy and legislation of IGOs and states as they relate 
to precious metals, and more specifically, gold. While similar to a literature review on 
policy, this chapter bridges the broad operational chain dynamics and specific regional 
cases of illicit finance related to gold and addresses relevant policy to address these major 
issues. Individual state responses are important to stymie these illicit flows, but as a 
majority transnational issue, IGO recommendations assessing regional risks and 
attempting to create standardization is essential. 
A. IGOS 
This section details gold-related CTF policy and recommendations created by the 
U.N., OECD, and the FATF. The U.N. is selected because of the global scope of its 
membership, positive action that may be taken through peace operations and sanctioning, 
a broad range of published materials related to international stability, and the 
international forum created for member states. The OECD is selected because of its work 
in producing tailored policy recommendations aimed at economic development. While 
AML/CFT is not a primary purpose of the OECD, the gold supplement of their due 
diligence guidance (OECD, 2013) is the basis for LBMA and DMCC sourcing policies 
and the WGC’s conflict-free gold standard (WGC, 2012). Much of the OECD’s work on 
countering corruption, bribery, and corporate misconduct also has relevance to CTF 
efforts as it pressures the market makers of illicit economies. The FATF is the final 
organization selected because of its central-founding purpose of AML/CFT and its 
keystone work on promulgating recommendations that are the international standard for 
financial sector integrity. 
1. U.N. 
 The United Nations Environment Programme ([UNEP], 2009, p. 5) states that 
40% of conflict globally in the last 60 years has at least in part been fueled by resource 
access. While only a minority of these conflicts are attributable to gold, this resource’s 
ability to fund and sustain conflict, negatively impact the environment, and create large 
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illicit economies further destabilizing impoverished regions requires a summation of the 
individual impacts to be able to assess its net effects. 
One of the major impacts of illicit economies surrounding gold relates to human 
rights abuses. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ([OHCHR], 2011) 
describes the idealized responsibilities that industries have in ensuring protections to their 
workers and the responsibilities that governments have in providing oversight, ensuring 
compliance, and establishing an environment where worker rights can be enforced. The 
significance of worker protections in CTF comes from the attempt to deny the growth of 
illicit economies instead of merely the predicate effects of funding conflict and nefarious 
activities. Like other IGO products, this document is not enforceable in international law 
but does create a foundation upon which policy and legislation can be based. 
The U.N. also maintains the capability to sanction individuals, groups, or states 
under the U.N. Charter (1945, Chapter VII). Exercising this capability, the U.N. has 
sanctioned ex-Séléka and anti-balaka individuals in the CAR under U.N. resolution 2127 
(Security Council Committee concerning the CAR, 2015) and armed Congolese actors in 
the DRC under U.N. resolution 1533 (Security Council Committee concerning the DRC, 
2015) which were highlighted in Chapter III of this thesis. The freezing of assets and 
bearing down on sanctioned entities’ means of support and continuance can be effective 
in denying formal sector access and providing a deterrence for non-sanctioned entities 
considering doing business with them, but it does not necessarily starve the illicit 
economies. 
U.N. peace operations can also affect illicit financing. The United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 
(MONUSCO) U.N. mandate contains directed efforts to put mining activities in the 
eastern DRC under government control (Security Council, 2014). The rebuilding of 
government and economic institutions during and after conflict may be difficult because 
of power dynamics, persistent instability, and systemic corruption, but providing 
oversight of mining and export activities and the groups and workers engaged in these 
does produce a net benefit if rule of law can be attained. 
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2. OECD 
The OECD (2011) published their Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
which is in line with the work of the OHCHR and UNEP referenced in the previous 
section. Significantly, these guidelines address corporate roles in relation to human rights, 
the environment, bribery, and taxation (OECD, 2011). The economic effects of tax 
revenue deprivation on governments can be particularly devastating in the developing 
world as it expands the cycle of poverty in already dispossessed populations by denying 
them government services. The OECD views tax compliance as an essential portion of 
“corporate citizenship” (OECD, 2011, p. 60) and this can be related to the operational 
chain of gold from source to market as informal ASM operations, obscured exports and 
imports, and refiners integrating illicitly sourced gold all stunt the additional benefits 
from taxation. 
The OECD’s gold supplement in their Due Diligence Guidance (OECD, 2013, pp. 
61-113) is the basis for industry action by the WGC (2012), LBMA (2013), and DMCC 
(2012). This guidance provides a five-step framework which accents the requirements for 
committed management, a risk-based approach to supply chain management, operations 
to mitigate these risks, independent audits, and transparency in corporate reporting 
(OECD, 2013, pp. 72-113). While not legally binding, the adoption of this guidance by 
industry has provided it with its effectiveness. 
3. FATF 
The FATF Recommendations is the seminal work on AML/CFT regulation and 
policy. Rooted in anti-laundering mechanisms for drug money in the early 1990s, the 
Recommendations have evolved with the global environment and have expanded to over 
180 signatories across the FATF and eight FSRBs (FATF, 2012, p. 7). The aggregate 
FATF network is structured as the premier forum for AML/CFT and its promotion is 
stressed by the United States as an implement to global economic security (White House, 
2015, p. 15). 
Recommendations 1, 22, 23, 28, 32, and 34 have been highlighted by the IMF as 
having direct relevance to the precious metals and stones markets (IMF, 2012, pp. 27–
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28). The first recommendation, implementing a risk based approach (RBA) (FATF, 2012, 
p. 11), is further developed in the FATF’s (2008) RBA Guidance for Dealers in Precious 
Metal and Stones and may be the most substantive recommendation with applicability to 
precious metals dealers. The RBA guidance was written prior to the latest publication of 
The FATF Recommendations, which creates asymmetry in the recommendation 
numbering; but the intent, and especially the RBA intent on country and geographic risks 
(FATF, 2008, pp. 20–22) gives the most holistic AML/CFT appraisal of illicitly sourced, 
exported, and laundered gold. Recommendations 22 and 23 both discuss designated non-
financial bodies and profession’s (DNFBP) responsibilities in conducting due diligence 
and alerting in suspicious transactions (FATF, 2012, pp. 19–20), recommendation 28 
highlights the creation of DNFBP regulatory bodies such as the DMCC or LBMA 
(FATF, 2012, p. 23), recommendation 32 discusses cash couriers which is often seen in 
cash-for-gold and illicit sales (FATF, 2012, p. 25), and recommendation 36 discusses 
feedback on the efficacy of solutions and the scope of money laundering and illicit 
financing issues (FATF, 2012, p. 26). 
B. STATE-LEVEL 
This section gives an overview of regulation and legislation in the United States, 
U.A.E., and Peru. The rationale for using these three countries relates to their respective 
impacts on gold supply and demand, the variance in risks faced and government 
capability in enforcement, and approaches to combating the respective illicit economies. 
These examples are narrowly focused on gold-based AML/CFT unless immediate 
application of strengthening legislation in an adjacent AML/CFT category is necessary; 
though it must be remembered that illicit gold transactions do not exist in a vacuum and 
other forms of illicit finance are generally incorporated. 
1. United States 
The United States has an extensive system of AML/CFT legislation and 
transparency of financial operations is regulated through laws such as the Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Title III of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
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Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) and a multitude of Executive 
Orders and Federal Statutes which allow the interagency to collect intelligence, track 
illicit finance, and prosecute primary and predicate offenses. Further, the FATF (2006, p. 
4) has pointed out an increase in compliance since the USA PATRIOT Act. Following 
the third round of mutual evaluations by the FATF, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also provided legislation on the 
sourcing of materials from conflict-affected regions. 
The last mutual evaluation by the FATF (2006, p. 12) estimated “approximately 
20,000 dealers in precious metals” servicing a portion of the industry which by 2012 had 
expanded to an industry satisfying a nationwide consumption demand of 162 metric tons 
and a fabrication demand of 147 metric tons (PwC, 2013a, p. 29). The FATF (2006, p. 
200) noted the legislated requirements to establish anti-money laundering programs by 
precious metals dealers but gave ratings of “non-compliant” based on the lack of 
requirements for DNFBP record keeping (FATF, 2006, p. 205) and suspicious activity 
report (SAR) submission (FATF, 2006, p. 210).  
Currently, gold dealers are subject to the regulations enforced by the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) (FinCEN, Department of the Treasury, 2015) 
and specifically parts 1010 and 1027. Part 1010 gives general provisions and the 
requirements for anti-money laundering programs, SARs, currency transaction reports 
(CTR), due diligence, and record keeping requirements (General provisions, 2015). Part 
1027 specifically provides regulation for gold dealers and to qualify as a precious metals 
dealer in the United States, annual purchases and receipts must exceed $50,000 of 50% 
purity alloy of precious metals as defined in part 1027.100 (Rules for dealers in precious 
metals, precious stones, or jewels, 2015). Together, these parts generally affect reporting 
requirements to the intersection of fiat currency purchases of a commodity. 
2. United Arab Emirates 
As a federation of seven emirates, control varies on different issues between the 
federal government level and the individual emirate level (CIA, 2015d, Government 
section). The Central Bank of the U.A.E., a federal organ, was founded by Union Law 
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No. (10) of 1980 Concerning the Central Bank, the Monetary System and Organization of 
Banking (1980) and oversees the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit, the 
Emirate’s FIU, that was established by article 7 of Federal Law No. (4) of 2002 
Regarding Criminalization of Money Laundering. 
The last FATF mutual evaluation of the U.A.E., conducted in 2008, cited certain 
issues with respect to gold. In this report, prevalence of sales and purchase of gold 
followed by transshipment of gold or large quantities of cash was considered “not 
uncommon” and declaration on export was considered a customs duty concern and not an 
AML/CFT concern (Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
[MENAFATF], FATF, & IMF, 2008, p. 54) and record keeping was not conducted for 
AML/CFT purposes (MENAFATF et al., 2008, p. 118). The requirement for third party 
audits (DMCC, 2012) by the DMCC since this mutual evaluation does enforce 
transparency and adequate record keeping but cash-for-gold operations still remain a 
potential issue for the integration of illicit gold. 
The intersection of hawala and gold may also open the door for laundering. 
Hawaladars are prevalent in the souk (Cassara & Jorisch, 2010; O’Brien, 2003) and 
efforts have been made since 2003 to regulate these businesses (Central Bank of the 
United Arab Emirates, 2003). Hawala licensing through the Central Bank requires a no-
charge application for the hawaladar with information on their occupation and a 
standardized ledger of remittances (Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, 2003, 
slides 5, 8, 12 & 14). However, the method expected to be used in settling accounts is 
notably absent from the registration form and record keeping (Central Bank of the United 
Arab Emirates, 2003, slides 8, 12 & 14) while opportunity is still provided for the transfer 
of value through settlement imbalance. 
3. Peru 
An excellent primer to AML/CFT policy in Peru is the National Plan for Fighting 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Superintendent of Banking, Insurance, and 
Private Pension Funds [SBS], 2011). This plan was enacted by Supreme Decree No. 057-
2011-PCM. The National Plan addresses the transnational effects of money laundering 
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and threat finance, provides overarching purpose for an AML/CFT plan, assesses risks 
and vulnerabilities, provides a way ahead for AML/CFT measures, and identifies the 
governmental stakeholders (SBS, 2011, pp. 9, 12, 19,27, and Annex). With a large cross 
over to gold-based threat finance, the National Plan identifies the risk associated with 
informal businesses in the Peruvian economy and the delicate formalization process that 
must occur to fully implement AML/CFT measures (SBS, 2011, p. 21). 
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America 
(GAFISUD; later renamed GAFILAT), published a 2011 risk assessment of DNFBPs in 
GAFISUD. The risk level for money laundering and threat finance was assigned a four 
out of five for DNFBPs (GAFISUD, 2011, p. 16), citing low registration rates across 
South America (GAFISUD, 2011, p. 9), low supervision in this sector, and the anonymity 
that allows for manipulation of exports and smuggling (GAFISUD, 2011, p. 18). 
However, mere regulation of DNFBPs in downstream operations does not address the 
thriving illicit economy of the informal ASM sector discussed in Chapter III. 
The Peruvian government (as cited by Valencia, 2013) has attempted to formalize 
ASM operations, especially in the Madre de Dios region, through Law 27651 in 2002, the 
National Plan for the Formalization of Artisanal Mining in 2011, and legislative Act 
1100. Throughout this, efforts have been made to encourage ASM miners to file 
declarations of intent, mineral concession rights, authorizations for land usage, 
authorization for water usage, and submit environmental plans, especially throughout 
2013 (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2013). However, Peru still faces a high level of 
difficulty in formalization because of the large profits, remote locations (Verité, 2012), 
and generally informal nature of the economy (SBS, 2011, p. 21) where the illicit mining 
economy provides one of the only ways to earn money. 
C. SUMMARY 
The unique factors in many countries place an emphasis on tailored risk-based 
strategies and initiatives to counter illicit finance and the economies that are grown out of 
them. Dependent on government legislation and capability, risk borne out of the specific 
economy, and intersections with other money laundering and threat finance typologies 
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within a state, the results of an individual risk-based approach must be thorough, tailored, 
and acknowledge the transnational nature of threat finance. 
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V. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE 
FATF/FSRB NETWORK 
This chapter explores the network structure of the FATF/FSRBs at the state and 
jurisdiction level (both referred to as actors for standardization and proper 
methodological terminology) and its potential effects on policy targeting and 
identification of at-risk states and jurisdictions. Furthermore, insight into network 
structures will be addressed and strategies for enhancing network resilience and policy 
targeting will be discussed.   
The FATF itself is structured around 34 nations, the GCC, the European 
Commission, one state observer, and an exhaustive list of IGOs and agencies (“FATF 
members and observers,” n.d.). In association with the FATF are eight additional FSRBs 
that address common issues related to the exploitation of the financial sector for nefarious 
purposes and the potentially destabilizing effects economically, financially, and 
physically. 
IGOs are effective in the common forum created, and they enable the construction 
of conduits for information to pass and ties between actors to form. As illustrated by the 
nature of the FATF/FSRB networks, recommendations can be made, but there is no 
mechanism of enforcement other than on the individual member level. The network does 
reinforce norms, values, and procedures but cannot entirely shoulder the burden. 
A. METHODOLOGY AND ATTRIBUTE DATA 
Chapter I presents an overview of the methodology for this chapter and the 
sources used for the compiled dataset. This section gives further definition to the 
methodology by explaining the network boundaries, the logic behind the valuation of ties, 
a discussion of the difference between ties and conduits, and purpose for inclusion of 
GDP data in the compiled dataset. The compiled dataset and an in-depth discussion of its 
sources are presented in the Appendix. 
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1. Network Boundaries 
This chapter presents individual networks and the aggregate network formed from 
actors’ membership in multiple FSRBs and the FATF. The value of the aggregate 
network lies in its broad scope to capture the international AML/CFT policy network. 
Individual networks include all actors with varying degrees of membership status but 
non-members are also included to enable direct comparison between individual networks. 
Sub-state actors or jurisdictions are also included in the individual networks and 
the aggregate (e.g., Aruba, Curaçao, Macao, and Hong Kong). Not only do they often 
have membership in FATF/FSRB networks (see Appendix), but economic latitude 
inherent in their statuses as either special administrative regions (e.g., Hong Kong) or 
subordinate parts of a larger entity (e.g., Aruba as a part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands) are important to include. 
Isolates are actors with no ties to other actors. In the aggregate network, 11 
isolates are included as shown in Table 1. These actors are important to include in the 
analysis because their absence from network membership may indicate a higher risk of 
criminal and terrorist financing, unwillingness to cooperate with international norms, or 
general inability of governance. Isolates may be excluded from some sociograms for ease 
of visualization but their presence is still included in calculating various metrics. 
Table 1.   Isolate States and Jurisdictions 
Cameroon CAR Chad DRC 
Rep. of Congo Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea 
Gabon Islamic Rep. of Iran Kosovo  
List of isolate states and jurisdictions that are not members of the FATF or any FSRB. 
See Appendix for sources.  
2. Valuation of Ties 
Ties between actors within each individual network and the aggregate network are 
coded based on four categories with the value of the tie strength shown in parentheses: no 
status/no tie (zero), other (one), observer (two), and member (three). All ties coded are 
undirected, meaning that if an actor has some degree of affiliation within a network, the 
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tie strength between that actor and all other network members is equal regardless of that 
actor’s contribution to the network. 
A counterargument exists to this method of valuing ties in that it is an 
oversimplified approach. Giving all ties a strength between one and three and an 
undirected nature may minimize the nuances of membership. The simplified allocation of 
strength values implies that a full member state has one and a half times the contribution 
of an observer and three times the contribution of an actor with ‘other’ status. This may 
not adequately reflect the importance of contributions from members’ signatory 
abilities—possibly undervaluing membership, or possible nominal membership status 
where a tie value may be overvalued (e.g., the DPRK’s observer status since 2014 
[“Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea,” n.d.] in the Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) gives ties to other APG members including the Republic of Korea and 
the United States). This problem is also present in the undirected nature of the ties 
because it insinuates that all members’ contributions are equal regardless of capability 
(e.g., Yemen and Saudi Arabia both have full membership in the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force [MENAFATF] [“About MENAFATF: Members and 
observers,” n.d.] meaning there is an equal tie strength and therefore equal capability and 
cooperation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia). 
The tie strength being put in four categories means that it is ordinal data instead of 
continuous. To accurately reflect the contributions and nuances of intra-network relations 
would require quantifying an individual subjective assessment of all 201 actors that have 
some degree of network membership. Not only is this difficult to capture and contains its 
own inherent risks, but international relations outside the bounds of the AML/CFT 
network precludes the ability for a temporal snapshot to maintain protracted relevancy 
(e.g., the Arab Spring’s effects on intra-network relations between actors in 
MENAFATF). To simplify the analysis of FATF/FSRB network resilience and policy 
targeting, simplified and undirected ties are adequate to map the network. 
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3. Ties versus Conduits 
The nature of the relationship networks documented in this chapter captures the 
interrelations on an actor-by-actor basis. All nine networks also contain some degree of 
outside IGO membership (e.g., the OECD’s status in the FATF [“FATF members and 
observers,” n.d.] or the FATF’s observer status in MENAFATF [“About MENAFTF: 
Members and observers,” n.d.]). These IGO networks would provide a more robust 
general nature to the network but their membership generally reflects a conduit whether 
real, potential, or nominal, rather than a relation that is realized by a tie. 
An example of a conduit versus a tie is the Egmont Group, an IGO based on 
cooperation between FIUs (http://www.egmontgroup.org). While ties may exist within 
this network such as between the United States’ FinCEN and the United Kingdom’s 
National Crime Agency resulting in tangible cooperation, other relations could best be 
described as nominal, such as Lebanon’s Special Investigation Commission Fighting 
Money Laundering and Israel’s Money Laundering Prohibition Authority (“List of 
members,” n.d.). For this reason, the Egmont Group is not included in assuming actor-by-
actor AML/CFT ties. Similar logic is used in the exclusion of the U.N.’s observer status 
in FATF/FSRB networks (“FATF members and observers,” n.d.) and individual FSRB 
observer status in other FSRBs. This means that conduits are excluded from the network 
because they only could be used to identify a potential for information transfer and do not 
necessarily contain the resiliency of a tie. The sole exceptions are Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman membership in the FATF represented by 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Dutch Caribbean states’ memberships in the 
FATF under the auspices of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (“FATF members and 
observers,” n.d.). 
Defining the nature of ties while excluding conduits also has the added benefit of 
viewing the AML/CFT policy world through the lens of national self-determination. 
Membership in the U.N. is practically universal with 193 states in the U.N. General 
Assembly (“Member states of the United Nations,” n.d.) and relations ranging from 
nominal conduits to robust ties. Individual issues faced regionally, religiously, ethnically, 
historically, or culturally are often reflected in membership (e.g., the Arabic speaking 
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world’s prominence in MENAFATF [“About MENAFATF: Members and observers,” 
n.d.] or the former Soviet bloc and Central Asian membership in the Eurasian Group on 
Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism [EAG] [“Eurasian Group on 
Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism,” n.d.]) and may actually add 
resiliency in ties and network strength because of this self-determination. 
4. Attributes 
The compiled dataset includes the GDP for 211 states/entities derived from the 
World Bank and the CIA’s The World Factbook. In this chapter GDP data is mainly used 
for the purpose of visualizing node’s (actor’s) size based on continuous GDP data. This 
same data could be further used to show correlation between economic size and other 
attributes such as degree centrality (number of ties to other actors). GDP data sources are 
further described in the Appendix. 
B. NETWORKS AND THE AGGREGATE 
This section introduces the individual FATF/FSRB networks through sociograms 
(network maps), select metrics, and a brief network description. While the individual 
visualizations exclude all isolates (any actor that has no level of network membership), 
isolate presence is still included in descriptive metrics to enable ease of comparison 
between networks.  The benefit to a consistent 212 actor network size is reflected in 
the measure of network density, which is calculated by the number of ties in a network 
divided by the number of potential ties (Everton, 2012, p. 399). The output is on a scale 
of zero (sparse/cosmopolitan) to one (dense/provincial) and can only be used to compare 
equally sized networks. With increasing actor membership, potential ties reflected in the 
denominator increases exponentially while an actor can realistically only maintain a 
limited number of ties (Everton, 2012, p. 399), effectively causing larger networks to be 
naturally more cosmopolitan. An alternative method for measuring network density is 
average degree centrality (sum of all ties in a network divided by number of actors) 
(Everton, 2012, p. 397), but by consistently maintaining a 212 actor network other 
benefits are realized such as the decrease in format errors in SNA programs when 
visualizing the aggregate network. 
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It should be noted that after the removal of isolates, all FATF and FSRB networks 
are cliques, meaning that all actors have ties to all other actors within their network, only 
weighting based on membership status determines placement. Metrics such as clustering 
coefficients, fragmentation, connectedness, E-I index, diameter, distance, and 
components do not provide valuable information because of this.  
Despite all actors having ties with all other non-isolate actors in each network, 
denser clusters are often formed in the sociograms because of the multidimensional 
scaling algorithm used. This algorithm assigns all actors a position in k-dimensional 
space based on their similarities or dissimilarities in the input matrix, calculates the stress 
function of the actors’ positions, and adjusts these positions until stress is minimized 
(Borgatti, 2007; Everton, 2012, pp. 58-59, 401). Optimizing the stress function results in 
clusters of actors with similar membership status, actors with dissimilarities often sent to 
the periphery (or sometimes similar actors simply to minimize the stress function), and 
sometimes a crystalline clique structure. 
The value of this network analysis is inherent in the co-membership in multiple 
networks and the ties that are therein formed. Mean network density of the FATF and 
FSRBs is 0.023 with a range of 0.007 to 0.053. In the following discussion of individual 
FATF/FSRB networks, those with less member states or jurisdictions will have a lower 







                                                 
1 All FATF/FSRB cliques exist in a 212 actor network. This means that there are 44,944 potential ties 
when calculating the density of each FATF/FSRB. Because each actor in a clique has a tie with all other 
actors in that clique, the number of actual ties increases as the number of members increases, and therefore 
the density of that network increases. 
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1. Financial Action Task Force 
After isolates (i.e., non-members) are removed, the FATF is a 44 actor clique with 
all actors having either member or observer status in the network. This is the foundational 
AML/CFT IGO established in 1989 and contains all G7 nations (“FATF members and 
observers,” n.d.), Russia is also a FATF member despite their G8 suspension (Acosta, 
2014). The Dutch Caribbean is included under the auspices of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the nations comprising the GCC are individually listed so as to reflect 
actor-by-actor ties within the network (“FATF members and observers,” n.d.). FATF 
network density is 0.042.2 Figure 1 displays a sociogram of the FATF with isolates 
removed. 
Figure 1.  Sociogram of the FATF network 
 
Sociogram of the FATF network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
                                                 
2 While the sociogram is presented with isolates removed, network metrics like density are calculated 
with isolates included. This applies to all FATF/FSRB networks examined. 
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2. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering  
After isolates are removed, the APG consists of 49 mainly Pacific Rim, South 
Asian, or European large economy nations (“Members & observers,” n.d.). Notably, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an observer to this network 
(“Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea,” n.d.). Earlier in this chapter the nature of 
conduits versus ties was discussed, and because of DPRK membership, a tenuous tie is 
illustrated between the DPRK and other APG member states that likely does not have the 
strength, resilience, or reciprocal directionality of other ties. APG network density is 
0.053. Figure 2 displays a sociogram of the APG with isolates removed. 
Figure 2.  Sociogram of the APG network 
 
Sociogram of the APG network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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3. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force  
After isolates are removed, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 
consists of 35 nations or sub-state entities mainly in the Caribbean and Americas 
(“Member countries,” n.d.). Because of the presence of European possessions in the 
Caribbean, many actors also have ties to the FATF and Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL) networks (e.g., Curaçao is an actor in this network and a possession of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, therefore sharing membership in these other two 
networks [“FATF members and observers,” n.d.; “Council of Europe,” n.d.]). CFATF 
network density is 0.027. Figure 3 is a sociogram of the CFATF with isolates removed. 
Figure 3.  Sociogram of the CFATF network 
 
Sociogram of the CFATF network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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4. Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism 
After isolates are removed, the EAG consists of 25 members. It has a low density 
(0.013), which reflects the low participation rate in this network. While some actors in 
this network have high degree centrality in the aggregate network, it is mostly comprised 
of Central Asian states as full members and a high proportion of former Soviet-bloc 
observers (“Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism,” n.d.). Figure 4 displays a sociogram of the EAG with isolates removed. 
Figure 4.  Sociogram of the EAG network 
 
Sociogram of the EAG network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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5. Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
After isolates are removed, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) consists of 23 members, which yields a low level of 
density (0.011) that is somewhat mitigated by observer status of some high degree 
centrality actors such as the United States and U.K. (“Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group,” n.d., Members & cooperating partners tab). As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the Indian Ocean nation of Comoros is significant as it also 
has network membership in Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering in West Africa (“Member states,” n.d.). Figure 5 displays a sociogram of 
ESAAMLG with isolates removed. 
Figure 5.  Sociogram of the ESAAMLG network 
 
Sociogram of the ESAAMLG network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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6. Financial Action Task Force of Latin America 
Akin to the MENAFATF in its structure, the 22 member GAFILAT network 
(formerly GAFISUD) has low density (0.010) and participation external to South 
America is centered on high income nations—Canada, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, 
and the United States (“Miembros,” n.d.). Figure 6 displays a sociogram of GAFILAT 
with isolates removed. 
Figure 6.  Sociogram of the GAFILAT network 
 
Sociogram of the GAFILAT network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
 57 
7. Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in 
West Africa 
The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) has the lowest density (0.007) reflecting its low participation rate (18 states) 
and is generally confined to West Africa (“Member states,” n.d.). More worrisome for 
aggregate network integrity is that this network has only two non-West African states 
with multiple network membership, Comoros and Portugal, and does not contain actor-
by-actor ties with any high income or well-connected states. Figure 7 displays a 
sociogram of GIABA with isolates removed. 
Figure 7.  Sociogram of the GIABA network 
 
Sociogram of the GIABA network with all non-members removed. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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8. Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
The 23-actor Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENAFATF) network has a low density (0.011) and full-member states reside in the 
Arab speaking world (“About MENAFATF: Members and observers,” n.d.). Ties to other 
nations in the aggregate network are strong based on the GCC’s (Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, U.A.E., and Qatar) membership in the FATF (“FATF members and 
observers,” n.d.) and links to the United States, France, Spain, and the U.K. This is also 
the single network membership of Palestine, represented in this sociogram as “West Bank 
and Gaza”. Somalia, not included in the dataset, is an observer state. Figure 8 displays a 
sociogram of MENAFATF with isolates removed. 
Figure 8.  Sociogram of the MENAFATF network 
 
Sociogram of the MENAFATF network with all non-members removed. See Appendix 
for sources. 
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9. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
The 38 member MONEYVAL network has an above mean density (0.031) and 
strong EU state membership (“Council of Europe,” n.d., drop-down menu labeled 47 
countries). This is also the sole network for some Channel Islands jurisdictions, Israel, 
and the Vatican (Holy See). Figure 9 displays a sociogram of MONEYVAL with isolates 
removed. 
Figure 9.  Sociogram of the MONEYVAL network 
 
Sociogram of the MONEYVAL network with all non-members removed. See Appendix 
for sources. 
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10. The Aggregate FATF/FSRB Network 
The aggregate network has over three times the density (0.189) of any single 
FATF/FSRB network, which is due to high amounts of multiple network membership 
and therefore actor-by-actor ties. 
The aggregate network sociogram in Figure 10 shows the output of a valued 
dataset with values of ties ranging from one to 32. The diameter/geodesic distance 
(longest path length between any two actors) is three, indicating relatively short paths 
between any participating actor. The average distance is 1.874 (meaning that on average 
a randomly selected actor is tied to another randomly selected actor through one separate 
actor) with a standard deviation of 0.533. 
Figure 10.  Sociogram of the aggregate network 
 
Sociogram of the aggregate network with isolates removed. See Appendix for sources. 
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Figure 11 shows the aggregate network with nodes colored by Newman groups 
(Clauset, Newman, & Moore, 2004). Newman groups is a clustering algorithm that 
groups actors based on a prevalence of ties within a group and a low number of ties 
between groups compared to a randomly drawn network with the same number of actors 
and ties (Everton, 2012, p. 401). Six groups were identified with a Newman modularity 
of 0.423 as calculated by ORA (Version 2.3.6; Carley, 2011). 
Figure 11.  Aggregate network with nodes colored by Newman Groups 
 
See Appendix for sources. 
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The Newman groups displayed in Figure 11 are beneficial in their ability to 
cluster actors based on group ties beyond individual FATF/FSRB network membership. 
The dark blue towards the center highlights Spanish and Portuguese speaking clusters 
beyond simple membership in GAFILAT (the exception being Canada’s membership in 
this Newman group). The aqua color on the right side is the Arab speaking world and is 
grouped to several central nations because of the GCC’s multiple membership in the 
MENAFATF and FATF, effectively bridging the divide. The yellow on the far left 
mainly consists of actors with sole network membership in MONEYVAL (larger yellow 
cluster) and EAG nations contained in the smaller yellow cluster slightly above. The 
dense red in the top center of the sociogram reflects the APG network. The teal on the top 
right is the Caribbean states with sole membership to CFATF, it is physically pulled 
closer to the center of the aggregate network because of ties to central actors as 
previously described. Most disconcerting is the light green displayed at the bottom of the 
sociogram indicating the distance of the ESAAMLG (bottom right) and GIABA (bottom 
center) from the rest of the aggregate, these are often described as jurisdictions of high 
concern and have low and weak actor-by-actor ties to the rest of the aggregate network. 
Figure 12 varies node size based on a SNA measure called “boundary spanner, 
potential,” which is defined in ORA (Version 2.3.6; Carley, 2011) as “the ratio of 
betweenness centrality to degree centrality.”3 Note that the sociogram appears slightly 
different as it has been “reenergized” using a spring embedded algorithm. Interestingly, 
nodes with weak ties existing in Channel Islands jurisdictions, the Vatican, and Israel are 
shown larger. Jersey (one of the Channel Islands) is also prominent as it has observer 
status in the CFATF. Comoros is also larger based on its attribute of connecting African 




                                                 
3 Betweenness centrality is a measure of the extent an actor lies on the shortest path between numerous 
pairs of actors (Everton, 2012, p. 397). Degree centrality is simply the number of ties that an actor has 
(Everton, 2012, p. 399). 
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Figure 12.  Aggregate network displaying boundary spanner, potential 
 
Channel Islands are shaded in blue, Israel and the Holy See are shaded in orange, and 
Comoros is shaded in green. See Appendix for sources. 
 64 
11. Network Decay 
One method to illustrate and test network resilience is to remove ties based on 
weight. With isolates removed, the aggregate network contains no single state whose 
removal fractures the network. Therefore, to manipulate the data in ORA (Version 2.3.6; 
Carley, 2011) and obtain a visualization of the effects of tie removal, values required for 
a tie to be displayed can be incrementally increased. 
Figure 13 displays the aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 
2.0 removed. Texture forms in the MONEYVAL network as the Isle of Man, Guernsey, 
Israel, and the Holy See begin to distance from the aggregate. Even though the Isle of 
Man and Guernsey are notable as offshore banking centers, their status as U.K. Crown 
Dependencies mitigates some risk. 
Figure 13.  Aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 2.0 
removed 
 
Isle of Man, Guernsey, Israel, and the Holy See are shaded in green. See Appendix for 
sources. 
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Figure 14 displays the aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 
3.0 removed. Isolates appear as they are distanced from the aggregate network (“former” 
MONEYVAL members discussed in the previous paragraph). CFATF shows a distance 
comparable to the African states but benefits from multiple strong ties to well-connected 
countries. 
Figure 14.  Aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 3.0 
removed 
 
New isolates appear on the right. CFATF is shaded in blue, African states are shaded in 
green, and well-connected states or jurisdictions with membership in CFATF are shaded 
in orange. See Appendix for sources. 
Figure 15 displays the aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 
5.0 removed. The resultant effect is texturing appearing in the APG with distancing of the 
DPRK because of its sole weak tie inherent in its observer status being stressed and West 




Figure 15.  Aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal 
 to 5.0 removed 
 
DPRK is shaded in blue, West Bank and Gaza is shaded in green. Isolates appear on the 
right. See Appendix for sources. 
Figure 16 displays the aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 
6.0 removed. It shows a significant amount of decay as GIABA is entirely separated from 
the aggregate network after losing all external actor-by-actor ties. A cluster of five 
Central Asian former Soviet states and Belarus can also be seen beginning to detach. In 
addition to previously mentioned isolates, Palestine, Burundi, Madagascar, and the 





Figure 16.  Aggregate network with ties of weight less than or equal to 6.0 
removed 
 
GIABA is shaded in green while Belarus and five Central Asian former Soviet states are 
shaded in blue. See Appendix for sources. 
12. Network Visualization Using Attributes 
Visualizing the network by degree centrality, the number of ties that an actor has 
to other actors (Everton, 2012, p. 399), may also be illuminating. Figure 17 was 
generated in Pajek (Version 3.08; Mrvar & Batagelj, 2012) and layers actors based on 
their attribute of degree centrality with the actor possessing the most ties (United States) 
at the top and isolates at the bottom. This figure was generated with all member ties 




1. Degree centrality, actors tied to numerous other actors score highly 
2. Eigenvector centrality, actors tied to numerous actors with numerous ties 
score highly (Everton, 2012, p. 400)  
3. Betweenness centrality, actors that lie on the shortest path between 
numerous pairs of actors score highly (Everton, 2012, p. 397) 
4. Closeness centrality, actors that are close in terms of path length to other 
actors score highly (Everton, 2012, p. 398)  
It should be noted that degree centrality is dominated by high GDP nations in the 
FATF, high eigenvector and closeness values are consistent with FATF membership, and 
betweenness is highly associated with those in the FATF and bridging to the 
Spanish/Portuguese speaking world. 
Figure 17.  Actors layered by degree centrality 
 




Table 2.   Centrality rankings of top five actors 
Degree (Raw Score) Eigenvector (Value) Betweenness 
(Value) 
Closeness (Value) 
1. United States 
(183) 
1. United States 
(0.272) 
1. United States 
(0.177) 





































See Appendix for sources. 
Figure 18 was generated in NetDraw (Version 2.139; Borgatti, 2002) and sizes 
nodes by GDP. This gives a quick visualization of individual actor’s structural location 
and a reference to economic size. While labels in the figure are difficult to read, the intent 
is to visualize the high GDP actors as being physically central in the aggregate network. 
This is also reflective of FATF membership exclusivity and the developing world status 











Figure 18.  Sociogram of aggregate network with nodes sized 
by GDP attributes 
 
Sociogram generated in NetDraw. Larger nodes are indicative of a higher GDP as central 
actors in the network are generally part of the developed world. See Appendix for 
sources. 
C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR RESILIENCE AND TARGETING 
The choice of strategic options open to the analyst are channeled and informed by 
the analysis conducted on the network. This section discusses potential strategies that can 
be used for promoting network resilience and policy targeting for at-risk jurisdictions. 
1. Resilience 
An important aspect to the FATF/FSRB network is the concept of self-
determination and the individual actor’s active choice to be part of the individual network 
or networks. Mandating membership may have the effect of creating a solid crystalline or 
lattice structure but also would likely have the adverse effect of straining voluntary 
participation as the network characteristics based off actors’ common characteristics’ and 
unique economic vulnerabilities would be diluted. It should be noted that a common 
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thread to the following three strategies emphasize the value of observer membership, or 
weak ties. 
1. Observer status on an actor level could be encouraged in order to 
strengthen the network by bridging various sections of the aggregate 
network. When looking at the aggregate network on an actor-by-actor 
level, it can be easily noted that “all bridges are weak ties (Granovetter, 
1973, p. 1364).” This is apparent in the observer membership of Comoros 
bridging the two African FSRBs or the tenuous nature inherent in single 
network status (e.g., Israel’s single weak tie to MONEYVAL). Observer 
status may not weaken the characteristics inherent in many networks and 
would effectively bridge FSRBs and allow for more actor-by-actor ties. 
2. The negative effect of structural holes in the aggregate network could be 
mitigated by encouraging redundancy of ties. While some FSRBs contain 
multiple strong connections to the aggregate (e.g., APG), other networks 
with high risk actors like GIABA have a very low quantity of actor-by-
actor ties. When the network decays as shown in Figures 13 through 16, 
CFATF can be shown increasing its distance from central actors but does 
not result in the same dire effects as GIABA because of a redundancy in 
ties. While Burt (1992) argues the advantages of brokerage nested in a 
lack of redundant ties, a resilient policy network could be at a great risk of 
destabilizing effects by allowing too much influence in a single actor. 
3. Reach out to isolate actors and encourage application to a FSRB. This is 
the “low-hanging fruit” of strategies to bring in at-risk jurisdictions. The 
benefits include encouragement of state level AML/CFT legislation, 
implementing efforts based off of FATF recommendations, actor-by-actor 
ties to these same at-risk jurisdictions, and how the networks and other 
actors already present in these networks can shape and influence the new 
member similar to the network rules of Christakis and Fowler (2009). The 
major hurdle in this third strategy is the willingness of the isolate or 
current network members to allow the new tie. Prior to 2014, the DPRK 
was an isolate until it received observer status in the APG (“Democratic 
Peoples’ Republic of Korea,” n.d.). Regardless of its affiliation, the 
strength of the weak tie is questionable as it possibly only creates nominal 
actor-by-actor ties. Using the same logic, integrating Iran may be 
questionable in its ultimate benefits and potential state reluctance to join. 
2. Policy Targeting 
The FATF frequently conducts mutual evaluations of member jurisdictions, 
publishes and updates recommendations, and publishes typology reports highlighting 
vulnerabilities. A single strategy for exhaustive identification of all at risk jurisdictions 
simply does not exist but SNA can provide a method of identification for probable high 
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threat regions. While all actors have some level of vulnerability to their financial systems 
being exploited by nefarious groups or persons, actors identified as only having weak ties 
and actors that are isolated can be readily identified as being at a higher risk. Using a 
risk-based analysis, individual FSRBs can also respond to unique economic and financial 
threats. 
Based upon Christakis and Fowler’s (2009) theories on influence and the value of 
closeness, actor-by-actor ties can be utilized to strengthen at-risk jurisdictions. Working 
on the postulate that influence spreads and the network’s characteristics shape the actors 
within, policy and recommendations can also be targeted to actors close to those that are 
at-risk. 
D. SUMMARY 
SNA is not a perfect tool for understanding the complexities and nuances of 
international relations and the AML/CFT environment, but it does allow in depth analysis 
of the underlying structures and characteristics of networks. Theory developed in the 
field through extensive research also assists in the explanation of the constraints and 
influence placed on actors, network efficiencies and effects, and enables an analysis of 
structural characteristics that may not be readily apparent. 
While the presence of IGO representation in regional networks is valuable in 
creating a robust network and fruitful cooperation, follow-up action and legislation must 
be taken by the individual actor. Analyzing the aggregate FATF/FSRB network on an 
actor-by-actor basis yields the potential for viable strategies in shaping the AML/CFT 
landscape and further increasing its resilience. 
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VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A robust policy network and recognition of factors contributing to the illicit use of 
gold throughout the operational chain greatly assists in financial sector stability and 
defining responses to tangible threats. This chapter presents available responses to 
counter the illicit use of gold, identifies current policy vulnerabilities affecting this 
commodity, potential methods to promote operational chain stability, and areas of further 
research that can be developed. 
A. FINDINGS 
This section presents research-based findings and methods to identify and disrupt 
the use of gold in threat financing operations, and policy suggestions to guide potential 
IGO recommendations and government policy implementation. A risk-based approach 
dominates the tactics that are used; regions with difficulty presented from informal or 
illicit economies in upstream operations are frequently those suffering from ungoverned 
spaces and lax controls, while downstream markets with large demand are often found in 
regions of at least relatively capable governance. Because of this dichotomy, varying 
approaches must be used to individual combat the ills of the operational chain while 
realizing that even informal economies may have positive contributions. 
1. Operational 
Recognition of the precursors to illicit mining activities and the effects created by 
its presence is likely the most important step to ensuring legitimacy throughout the 
operational chain. While smuggling operations, laundering activities, and the shadowy 
transfer of funds between criminal and terrorist enterprises can be highly damaging, the 
scale of government tax revenue lost, legitimate industry avoidance in developing 
economies, and propensity for illicit economies to flourish in this environment far 
outweigh the downstream risks. Recognizing the presence of these illicit economies, 
conducting analysis of trade discrepancies, and dismantling peripheral activities are all 
potential opportunities for promoting a secure market and preventing its misuse. 
 74 
a. Recognition of Illicit Mining 
Recognition of illicit mining activities is necessary in a risk-based approach to 
counter fundraising in upstream operations. While not illegal in all circumstances, ASM 
operations are higher-risk activities that are often found alongside human-rights 
violations (Verité, 2012), damaging environmental processes (Blacksmith Institute, 
2010), potential exploitation by armed groups, and exposure to smuggling operations 
(OECD, 2013, p. 71). 
Observable indicators of local ASM operations may take the form of small-scale 
mercury sales catering to ASM miners using mercury amalgamation (Blacksmith 
Institute, 2010), cash-for-gold operations accepting raw gold or gold doré (Verité, 2012), 
and environmental damage including clear-cutting of vegetation, scarring of resource-
exploited land, and animal die-off from mercury pollution (Elbein, 2015; Verité, 2012). 
While these operations are prone to occur in areas of lax or absent governance, these cues 
to illegal ASM operations are readily apparent. 
b. Trade Transparency Units 
TTUs can be used to identify discrepancies in trade data between countries 
(Cassara & Jorisch, 2010, p. 68). Occurring in downstream operations, smuggling and 
misrepresentation of goods and quantities shipped may easily allow for value to be 
siphoned off and used for nefarious purposes, obscure the quantity imported from a 
questionable origin, or used to evade import taxes. The examination of corresponding 
import and export documentation provides the opportunity to analyze discrepancies and 
patterns of misrepresentation that may be indicative of TBML or smuggling (Cassara & 
Jorisch, 2010, pp. 69-74).  
Data gathered by TTUs and shared with FIUs may also present indicators of illicit 
sourcing. In the case of the greater African Great Lakes region where gold is smuggled 
from the source country to an intermediate stop before export, TTU data on exports can 
be matched to mining estimates to establish if the claimed origin is likely false. The 
OECD (2013, p. 79) highlights excessively-claimed origin in a country with low output 
as one of their red flag indicators for illicit sourcing. 
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c. Dismantling Illicit Economies 
The displacement of large populations to former sparsely populated regions and 
capital investment on any scale can form illicit economies that surround mining 
operations. Verité (2012) gives an in-depth description of human trafficking for 
prostitution and menial labor, debt bondage, and services provided at ad hoc mining 
encampments. Illegal mining operations attract an informal economy that operates 
without regulation. 
Combating the activities surrounding illegal mining may limit production 
capabilities. As evidenced in informal mining towns like La Rinconada (Finnegan, 2015), 
inhospitable climates and remote locations necessitate ancillary operations whose 
regulation can stifle the primary operation. Second-order effects on illegal mining 
operations can also be achieved through efforts at combating human trafficking and 
blocking the import of necessary machinery and chemicals to at-risk regions. 
2. Policy 
Operational capabilities are generally focused on financial sector security through 
the denial of informal and illicit economies that are most vulnerable to laundering 
activities and illicit finance. This hardline approach of focusing on denial presents short-
term positive effects (i.e., enforcing formalization of miners in Peru and destroying 
equipment of those whom are non-compliant), but intermediate effects may result in 
recidivism to informal or illegal practices and long-term effects may include a further 
economic depression in a region with few legitimate alternatives and possible social 
upheaval causing further instability. 
Policy efforts are often contingent on the established presence of rule of law and 
the capability of governance. They also create a stable market environment that can affect 
the upstream operations by focusing demand on legitimate sourcing options and 
discouraging the use of questionable activities. The FATF, individual governments, and 
industry groups all have the ability to promote legitimacy and can take on a nuanced 
approach that combats illicit activities while defending the opportunities of those workers 
and disadvantaged populations with few legitimate alternatives.  
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a. FATF  
FSRB membership should be universally encouraged, especially for high-risk 
states. Four of the eleven isolate states, the DRC, CAR, Republic of the Congo, and 
Cameroon, are all within the greater African Great Lakes region or are used as gold 
smuggling routes from the region. While FATF recommendations do not carry the weight 
of law, exposure through regional forums and mutual evaluations of existing economic 
environments and legislation could increase transparency and promote the establishment 
of stronger AML/CFT efforts. 
The FATF Recommendations are also incomplete in countering illicit financing 
with gold and other commodities. Recommendations 22 and 23 apply specifically to 
DNFBPs (FATF, 2012, pp. 19-20), but focus entirely on the dealers in downstream 
operations and gold’s intersection with cash transactions. While it is useful to file CTRs 
and SARs with FIUs, much of the risk of terrorist and criminal financing comes from 
upstream operations in locations where CTRs and SARs are not practicable and among 
parties that would never file these reports. Recommendations should be added to ensure 
that downstream DNFBPs are required to follow due-diligence procedures in their 
sourcing. 
b. Government 
Government policy needs to reflect how gold is a high-liquidity currency that 
easily intersects with other forms of threat financing, how it establishes vast illicit 
economies, and how it may be the only source of livelihood for workers from 
disadvantaged populations. Unfortunately, there is immense difficulty in balancing these 
imperatives with large demand, lack of legitimate economic opportunities, and ineffective 
governance. 
The U.A.E.’s ongoing attempt at registering the hawala system recognizes the 
need for accountability in documenting the direction, parties, and amounts of funds 
transferred, but neglects the key question of how the books are balanced between 
hawaladars. Gold being a common method of account settlement (Cassara & Jorisch, 
2010, pp. 100–101), the hawala registration documentation and reports on remittances 
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(Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, 2003, slides 8, 12, and 14) do track 
customers and require the hawaladar to report the nature of their business, but they do not 
require specifics on account settlement methods. While it may be assumed that a souk 
merchant would use gold imports and exports for settlement of hawala accounts, the 
valuation of these transactions needs to be monitored to reduce the likelihood of tariff 
avoidance, money laundering, and terrorist financing. 
Attacking the constituent elements of illicit economies is an indirect approach to 
reducing the supply of illicitly mined gold, but may have the additional benefits of 
blocking exploitation by criminal elements. Even in the primitive conditions of ASM 
operations in the CAR, DRC, and parts of Peru, large support operations for the miners 
and intricate smuggling networks for integration of illicitly mined gold into the legitimate 
supply is necessary. As laundering activities and illicit finance are often predicate 
offences for illegal operations, there must be awareness that the predicate functions 
required to be in place for mining operations are often also controlled by criminal 
elements and nefarious groups. 
A balance must also be made between completely shutting off illegal and informal 
mining operations and letting them run freely. While efforts like the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act of 2010 make it attractive to entirely avoid sourcing 3TG minerals 
from conflict-affected regions, conflict-free ASM operations within the African Great 
Lakes region also provides one of the only sources of livelihood in an otherwise 
economically desolate area. PwC (2013a, p. 17) documented this economic question in 
that they estimate the approximately five-million ASM gold miners worldwide make an 
assumed U.S. $10 per day which is generally well above other wage sources in depressed 
communities. Efforts to formalize mining operations (e.g., Peru) or create obstacles to 
sourcing from conflict-affected regions must take precautions to avoid extinguishing all 
economic opportunity. 
c. Industry 
Adoption of industry best practices from mine to market is beneficial when they 
are used throughout the operational chain. The WGC’s (2012) Conflict-Free Gold 
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Standard, the DMCC’s (2012) Practical Guidance, the LBMA’s (2013) Responsible Gold 
Guidance, and the Responsible Jewellery Council’s (2013) Code of Practices all 
champion a risk-based approach to identifying conflict sourcing, human rights abuses, 
and the potential for terrorist financing. Industry self-regulation and policing efforts 
shoulder some of the burden of AML/CFT efforts, can assist in the starvation of demand 
from illicit economies, and provide practical solutions from industry experts. 
Adoption of these standards should be encouraged whenever possible. A leading 
risk to their failure is a break in due-diligence; if miners and refiners are not upholding 
their due-diligence efforts or misrepresenting their claims, downstream markets’ and 
other operations’ due-diligence efforts will likewise be negatively impacted.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Gold can be used to launder criminal proceeds, transfer value between nefarious 
actors with a high degree of anonymity, settle accounts in IVTS, fund armed insurgencies 
through the control of mining activities, destroy workers health and the environment, 
contribute to human trafficking, and stunt positive infrastructure growth in developing 
economies. It also provides a means of diversification for central banks, a multi-billion 
dollar global trade, a hedge against inflation for investors, and an income source, both 
direct and indirect, for millions of workers. Unique risks are present in all segments of 
the operational chain from mine to market and among different geographic regions. The 
misuse of gold, like in many CTF subjects, has the major commonality of being 
transnational in scope. 
This thesis presented an overview of the operational chain and its vulnerabilities, 
specific regional cases of abuse throughout the chain, policy efforts aimed at promoting a 
stable market supporting legitimate activity, the FATF/FSRB network that promotes this 
stability, and research-based findings. While this research was intentionally limited in 
scope to the operations, vulnerabilities, and policies related to gold; additional research 
could be conducted into the intersection of gold with other money laundering and 
terrorist financing methods, the net effects of shutting down or criminalizing informal 
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economies, the instability caused by 3TG and other resources, or the effectiveness of 
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APPENDIX.  COMPILED DATASET AND SOCIOGRAM SOURCES 
This appendix describes the 212 actor dataset compiled from multiple online 
sources that is extensively used throughout Chapter V and the SNA software that was 
used to generate sociograms and select metrics. The intent is not to provide new 
information, but instead to provide credit for the information and provide insight into the 
data used to generate the figures. 
A. DATASET 
The compiled dataset consists of 212 actors (state or jurisdiction) and are listed in 
Table 3. The first column of the table gives the name of the state or jurisdiction, while the 
last column presents its GDP in millions of U.S. dollars. The nine columns in between 
represent the FATF or one of the FSRBs with the first row providing labels one through 
nine and the following rows are assigned a blank, or the number one, two, or three. One 
represents “other” status, two represents “observer” status, and three represents 
“member” status. Table 1 in Chapter V was created by naming the states or jurisdictions 
that are not a FATF/FSRB member in the compiled dataset. 
Information collected for the center nine columns comes from 10 websites. 
Multiple sources were used in all cases except the FATF network membership to check if 
there was a discrepancy between information, and in the case that they were not identical, 
the membership lists were combined. The following list is numbered to indicate the 
column number matching the dataset, the name of the body, and a reference of where the 
information was obtained: 
1. FATF 
FATF members and observers. (n.d.). Retrieved May 3, 2015, from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ 
2. APG 




Member countries. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2015, from https://www.cfatf-
gafic.org/index.php/member-countries 
4. EAG 
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. (n.d.). 
Retrieved May 30, 2015, from http://www.eurasiangroup.org/ 
5. ESAAMLG 
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 
2015, from http://esaamlg.org/ 
6. GAFILAT 
Miembros. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2015, from 
http://www.gafilat.org/content/observadores/ 
7. GIABA 
Member states. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2015, from http://www.giaba.org/member-
states/index_653.html 
8. MENAFATF 
About MENAFATF: Members and observers. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2015, from 
http://menafatf.org/topiclist.asp?ctype=about&id=430 
9. MONEYVAL 
Council of Europe. (n.d.) Retrieved May 30, 2015, from 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/ 
The table at the following source was also a reference for all columns in the 
compiled dataset: 
Countries. (n.d.). Retrieved May 3, 2015, from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ 
The GDP data was taken from two sources: the World Bank and the CIA’s The 
World Factbook. The World Bank’s dataset was consulted first but was missing data on 
19 actors used in the compiled dataset. These countries or jurisdictions missing were 
Anguilla, Aruba, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Curaçao, DPRK, Guernsey, Holy See, 
Isle of Man, Jersey, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Niue, San Marino, Sint Maarten, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Turks and Caicos, and the Virgin Islands (U.K.). Their GDP data was 
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retrieved from their respective country page in The World Factbook. The references are 
as follows: 
The World Bank. (2015b). Gross domestic product 2014 [pdf]. Retrieved May 3, 2015, 
from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2015). The World Factbook [data base]. Retrieved May 3, 
2015, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/ 
Table 3.   Compiled Dataset 
State or Jurisdiction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  GDP (millions 
U.S. $)  
Afghanistan  3  2                         20,310  
Albania         3                    12,923  
Algeria        3                   210,183  
Andorra         3                     4,800  
Angola     3                       124,178  
Anguilla   3                                175  
Antigua and Barbuda   3                             1,201  
Argentina 3     3                     609,889  
Armenia    2     3                    10,432  
Aruba 3  3                            2,584  
Australia 3 3                       1,560,372  
Austria 3        1                   428,322  
Azerbaijan         3                    73,560  
Bahamas   3                            8,420  
Bahrain 3       3                     32,890  
Bangladesh  3                          149,990  
Barbados   3                            4,225  
Belarus    3                         71,710  
Belgium 3                           524,806  
Belize   3                            1,624  
Benin       3                        8,307  
Bermuda   3                            5,474  
Bhutan  3                              1,781  
Bolivia      3                        30,601  
Bosnia and Herzegovina         3                    17,851  
Botswana     3                         14,785  
Brazil 3     3                   2,245,673  
Brunei Darussalam  3                            16,111  
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Bulgaria         3                     54,480  
Burkina Faso       3                       12,885  
Burundi     2                          2,715  
Cambodia  3                           15,239  
Cameroon                             29,568  
Canada 3 3 1   2                   1,826,769  
Cape Verde       3                         1,879  
Central African Republic                               1,538  
Cayman Islands   3                            2,250  
Chad                             13,514  
Chile      3                     277,199  
China (Peoples Republic of) 3 3  3                     9,240,270  
Chinese Taipei  3                         505,500  
Colombia      3                     378,415  
Comoros     3  2                           599  
Congo, Dem. Rep.                             32,691  
Congo, Rep.                              14,086  
Cook Islands  3                                 183  
Costa Rica      3                       49,621  
Croatia         3                     57,869  
Cuba      3                        68,234  
Curaçao 3  3                            5,600  
Cyprus         3                     21,911  
Czech Republic         3                  208,796  
Côte d'Ivoire       3                      31,062  
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea 
 2                           28,000  
Denmark 3                           335,878  
Djibouti                               1,456  
Dominica   3                                517  
Dominican Republic   3                           61,164  
Ecuador      3                       94,473  
Egypt        3                    271,973  
El Salvador   3                          24,259  
Equatorial Guinea                             15,581  
Eritrea                                3,444  
Estonia         3                    24,880  
Ethiopia     3                        47,525  
Fiji  3                              3,855  
Finland 3                           267,329  
France 3 2 1 2  2  2 2                2,806,428  
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Gabon                             19,344  
Gambia       3                            903  
Georgia    2     3                    16,140  
Germany 3 2  2  2                   3,730,261  
Ghana       3                      48,137  
Greece 3                          242,230  
Grenada   3                              836  
Guatemala   3   3                       53,797  
Guernsey         1                      2,742  
Guinea       3                       6,144  
Guinea-Bissau       3                          961  
Guyana   3                            2,990  
Haiti   3                           8,459  
Holy See         1                           -    
Honduras      3                       18,550  
Hong Kong, China 3 3                         274,013  
Hungary         3                  133,424  
Iceland 3                            15,330  
India 3 3  3                     1,875,141  
Indonesia  3                         868,346  
Iraq        3                    229,327  
Ireland 3                          232,077  
Islamic Republic of Iran                            368,904  
Isle of Man         1                       4,076  
Israel         1                   290,551  
Italy 3   2                     2,149,485  
Jamaica   3                          14,362  
Japan 3 3  2     2                4,919,563  
Jersey   2      1                       5,771  
Jordan        3                     33,679  
Kazakhstan    3                       231,876  
Kenya     3                        55,243  
Kiribati  2                                 169  
Korea 3 3                      1,304,554  
Kosovo                               7,072  
Kuwait 3       3                    175,831  
Kyrgyzstan    3                            7,226  
Lao People's Democratic Republic  3                           11,243  
Latvia         3                     30,957  
Lebanon        3                     44,352  
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Lesotho     3                           2,335  
Liberia       3                        1,951  
Libya        3                      74,200  
Liechtenstein         3                       5,113  
Lithuania    2     3                    45,932  
Luxembourg 3                            60,131  
Macao (China)  3                           51,753  
Macedonia, FYR         3                    10,195  
Madagascar     2                        10,613  
Malawi     3                           3,705  
Malaysia 2 3                          313,159  
Maldives  3                              2,300  
Mali       3                      10,943  
Malta         3                      9,642  
Marshall Islands  3                                 191  
Mauritania        3                      4,158  
Mauritius     3                        11,929  
Mexico 3  1   3   2               1,260,915  
Micronesia  2                                 316  
Moldova    2     3                      7,970  
Monaco         3                       6,075  
Mongolia  3  2                          11,516  
Montenegro    2     3                      4,416  
Montserrat   3                                43  
Morocco        3                    103,836  
Mozambique     3                       15,630  
Myanmar  3                           65,290  
Namibia     3                        13,113  
Nauru  3                                 60  
Nepal  3                           19,294  
Netherlands 3  1                        853,539  
New Zealand 3 3                         185,788  
Nicaragua      3                       11,256  
Niger       3                         7,407  
Nigeria       3                    521,803  
Niue  3                                   10  
Norway 3                          512,580  
Oman 3       3                      79,656  
Pakistan  3                         232,287  
Palau  3                               247  
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Panama      3                       42,648  
Papua New Guinea  3                           15,413  
Paraguay      3                       29,009  
Peru      3                      202,350  
Philippines  3                         272,067  
Poland    2     3                  525,866  
Portugal 3    2 2 2                    227,324  
Qatar 3       3                   203,235  
Romania         3                  189,638  
Russian Federation 3 2  3     3                2,096,777  
Rwanda     3                          7,521  
Saint Kitts and Nevis   3                                766  
Saint Lucia   3                             1,336  
Saint Maarten 3  3                               304  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   3                               709  
Samoa  3                                802  
San Marino         3                      1,858  
Sao Tome and Principe       3                           311  
Saudi Arabia 3       3                    748,450  
Senegal       3                      14,792  
Serbia    2     3                    45,520  
Seychelles     3                           1,443  
Sierra Leone       3                        4,136  
Singapore 3 3                          297,941  
Slovak Republic         3                    97,707  
Slovenia         3                     47,987  
Solomon Islands  3                            1,096  
South Africa 3    3                       366,058  
South Sudan                             11,804  
Spain 3  1   2  2                1,393,040  
Sri Lanka  3                            67,182  
Sudan        3                     66,566  
Suriname   3                             5,299  
Swaziland     3                           3,791  
Sweden 3                          579,680  
Switzerland 3                          685,434  
Syrian Arab Republic        3                     64,700  
Tajikistan    3                           8,508  
Tanzania     3                        43,647  
Thailand  3                         387,252  
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Timor-Leste  3                              1,270  
Togo       3                        4,339  
Tonga  3                                466  
Trinidad and Tobago   3                          24,641  
Tunisia        3                     46,994  
Turkey 3   2                        822,135  
Turkmenistan    3                         41,851  
Turks and Caicos Islands   3                              632  
Tuvalu  2                                 38  
Uganda     3                        24,703  
Ukraine    2     3                  177,431  
United Arab Emirates 3       3                   402,340  
United Kingdom 3 2 1  2   2                2,678,455  
United States 3 3 1 2 2 2  2 2             16,768,100  
Uruguay      3                       55,708  
Uzbekistan    3                         56,796  
Vanuatu  3                                 828  
Venezuela   3                         438,284  
Vietnam  3                          171,390  
Virgin Islands (UK)   3                            1,095  
West Bank and Gaza        2                     11,262  
Yemen        3                      35,955  
Zambia     3                        26,821  




B. SOCIOGRAMS AND SOURCES OF SELECT METRICS 
The sociograms were generated using the compiled dataset and three different 
SNA software programs: for Figure 18, NetDraw (Version 2.139; Borgatti, 2002); for 
Figures 1 through 16, ORA (Version 2.3.6; Carley, 2011); and for Figure 17, Pajek 
(Version 3.08; Mrvar & Batagelj, 2012). The network metrics in Tables 2 was calculated 
using a fourth SNA software program, Ucinet 6 (Version 6.512; Borgatti & Freeman, 
2002). The references for these four software programs are as follows: 
 
Borgatti, S. P. (2002). NetDraw: Graph Visualization Software, version 2.139 [Computer 
software]. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
Borgatti, S. P. & Freeman, L. C. (2002). Ucinet 6 for Windows, version 6.512 [computer 
software]. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
Carley, K. M. (2011). ORA, version 2.3.6 [Computer software]. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
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